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I. INTRODUCTION
The outcome of the WTO challenges1 to the Australian legislation
1. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Certain
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Tobacco Plain
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prescribing plain packaging for tobacco, in the context of
trademarks, will almost certainly turn on the meaning of Article 20
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS” or “TRIPS Agreement”). However, to understand
the meaning of Article 20, we must undertake a detailed assessment
of the entire trademarks regime under TRIPS and basic principles
underpinning TRIPS. Article 20 provides,
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements, such as use with another trademark,
use in a special form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to
distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings. This will not preclude a requirement prescribing the use of
the trademark identifying the undertaking producing the goods or services
along with, but without linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the
specific goods or services in question of that undertaking. 2

This article addresses the interpretation of Article 20. We start by
briefly identifying the salient features of the Australian plain
packaging legislation and the nature of the problems that tobaccocontrol measures aim to address.
We then discuss the nature of the entitlements that TRIPS confers
upon trademark owners by reference to the widely understood and
accepted proposition that property consists of a bundle of different
relationships between different people in relation to the same thing:
Packaging]; Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia –
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT/DS444/1 (July 23, 2012); Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia –
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr.
10, 2012) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia –
Tobacco Plain Packaging]; Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia –
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013); Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia –
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT/DS467/1 (Sept. 25, 2013).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 108
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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in this case, trademarks. We conclude that trademark owners enjoy a
privilege of using their trademarks but we deny that trademark
owners have a right or anything resembling a right to use their
trademarks, and we specifically reject the suggestion that the
entitlements of trademark owners to positive use of their trademarks
exist on some spectrum between a right and a privilege. We further
argue that owners’ privileges of use of their trademarks are subject to
restrictions on the basis of other legitimate interests. Our discussion
of the theory of rights and privileges is then supported by a closer
examination of the trademark provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
which clearly support the proposition that Article 20 does not confer
any right to use upon trademark owners, but rather deals with the
circumstances in which their privilege of use may be restricted by
governments.
After concluding that trademark owners have a defeasible
privilege of using their trademarks, we identify the respective
interests of trademark owners and government for the purposes of
identifying the key aspects of the relationship between trademark
owners and government that determine the extent to which the
privilege of use is defeasible. On the basis of this analysis, we
conclude that Australia’s plain packaging legislation is likely to be
lawful under TRIPS.

II. WHAT DOES THE AUSTRALIAN PLAIN
PACKAGING LEGISLATION DO?
For present purposes, the legislation has three major effects on
retail packaging for tobacco. First, no non-word signs of any kind
can be used other than a limited number of prescribed signs.3 For
example, the background color of packaging is a drab brown.4 The
prohibition on non-word signs necessarily includes a prohibition of
non-word trademarks as the latter are a subset of the former. The
prescriptions on use extend to controlling the size and shape of all
aspects of packaging. For example, soft packs are prohibited and
only standard flip top boxes can be used.5 The shape of the cigarette
3. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 20(2) (Austl.).
4. See id. s 19(2)(ii) (requiring all outer aspects of primary and secondary
packaging to be the color Pantone 448C).
5. Id. s 18(2).
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sticks is also prescribed.6 Second, word trademarks are permitted but
they are limited to a particular font size and font or type face and are
restricted as to the space on the packaging in which they can appear.7
The color of the word trademarks is also prescribed.8 Third, the
packaging must have large text and graphic warnings that cover
ninety percent of the back of the packaging and seventy-five percent
of the front of the packaging.9
The plain packaging legislation also provides that the opportunity
to obtain registration of tobacco trademarks is not lost as a
consequence of the legislation.10 Usually, an applicant for
registration is required to have an intention to use a trademark.11 The
absence of such an intention is not a disqualifying factor if the plain
packaging legislation is the reason for the lack of an intention to
use.12 In addition, trademarks that are not used because of the
legislation are immune from removal for non-use.13

A. OBJECTIVES OF THE LEGISLATION
The stated objectives of the legislation include improving public
health by discouraging people from taking up smoking, or using
tobacco products; encouraging people to give up smoking, and to
stop using tobacco products; discouraging people who have given up
smoking, or who have stopped using tobacco products, from
relapsing; and reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco
products.14 A further objective is to give effect to certain obligations
Australia has under the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control.15 The legislation goes on to state Parliament’s intention to
6. Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 3.1.1 (Austl.).
7. Id. divisions 2.3, 2.4; TPP Act 2011 s 20.
8. TPP Regulations reg 2.3.2(c)(iv), 2.4.1(f).
9. Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard 2011 (Cth)
part 9 div 4 sub-divs 1–2 (Austl.).
10. TPP Act 2011 s 28.
11. See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 27(1)(b) (Austl.).
12. TPP Act 2011 s 28(1).
13. Id. s 28(3).
14. Id. s 3(1)(a).
15. Id. s 3(1)(b). See generally Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR
416, 487 (Austl.) (holding that as a matter of Australian constitutional law, it is the
responsibility of the Australian Parliament “to choose the means by which it
carries into or gives effect to” an international agreement, provided that the
legislation enacted is “reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

510

[29:3

contribute to achieving these objects
by regulating the retail packaging and appearance of tobacco products in
order to:
a. reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers; and
b. increase the effectiveness of health warnings on the retail packaging of
tobacco products; and
c. reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to mislead
consumers about the harmful effects of smoking or using tobacco
products.16

The prohibition of non-word signs and the prescription of the use
of the brown background color are designed to reduce the
attractiveness of packaging and, therefore, the contents of that
packaging.17 The reduction of the attractive aspects of the packaging
is designed to ensure greater awareness of the large text and graphic
warnings that are placed on the packaging.18 In addition, restrictions
on permissible signs are designed to prevent cigarette manufacturers
from conveying misleading impressions about qualities of their
cigarettes.19
Brands are distinguished in a retail setting by their word
trademarks because of the mechanisms governing the sale of
cigarettes in Australia. Prior to the plain packaging legislation,
cigarettes were banned from display at the point of retail sale. 20 They
adapted to implementing the treaty”). It is within this domestic constitutional
context that the plain packaging legislation characterizes one of its objectives as
giving effect to obligations under the World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. The legislature is making it clear that it has
chosen plain packaging as the means of complying with Australia’s obligations
under Articles 11 and 13. World Health Organization Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, Feb. 27, 2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166; see also Jonathan Liberman,
The Power of the WHO FCTC: Understanding Its Legal Status and Weight, in THE
GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC AND THE LAW (Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon eds.,
forthcoming) (arguing that there is more than a “binding” or “non-binding”
approach to interpreting the World Health Organization Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control).
16. TPP Act 2011 s 3(2).
17. Id. s 3(2)(a).
18. Id. s 3(2)(b).
19. Id. s 3(2)(c). For the purposes of this article, we speak primarily about
packaging of tailor-made cigarettes because of ease of explanation. There are some
separate issues concerning cigars, but the focus of this article is on plain packaging
for cigarettes.
20. See, e.g., Tobacco Act 1987 (Vic) (Austl.); Tobacco and Other Smoking
Products Act 1998 (Qld) (Austl.); Tobacco Products Regulations 2004 (SA)
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still are. The only indication of the cigarette inventory held at a retail
point is a list of brand names together with prices at the point of
sale.21 Consumers order by reference to the name of the brand. The
salesperson then takes the requested cigarettes from a closed, nontransparent cupboard and processes the sale. The figurative or nonword aspects of the packaging were not and are not relevant at the
retail stage to distinguishing one brand from another. They would be
relevant post-sale when packaging is displayed in a social setting by
consumers who have already completed the purchase of their
cigarettes. Later, we deal with the relevance of this process in
relation to the issue of “use of trademarks in the course of trade.”22
Assertions that the intention of the plain packaging measures is to
make cigarette packages indistinguishable from one another are
incorrect, at least in light of the importance of word trademarks until
the point at which a retail sale is complete.23 For example, there is no
evidence that consumers order Marlboro cigarettes by any means
other than asking for “Marlboro” as opposed to “the packet with the
red chevron device and the coat of arms.”24

B. WHY CIGARETTES ARE A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM
The proposition that cigarettes are bad for you is trite. Many things
are bad for our health. The more important questions are as follows:
What is the nature of the harm to health that occurs from cigarette
usage? What is the extent of that harm and how does the use of signs,

(Austl.); Tobacco Products Control Act 2006 (WA) (Austl.); Public Health
(Tobacco) Act 2008 (NSW) (Austl.).
21. See, e.g., Tobacco Products Regulations 2004 reg 10 (SA) (Austl.).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.F–G.
23. See, e.g., JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43, 290 (Austl.)
(“[T]he visual, verbal, aural and allusive distinctiveness, and any inherent or
acquired distinctiveness, of a brand name can continue to affect retail consumers
despite the physical restrictions on the appearance of brand names imposed by the
Packaging Act.”); see also N.V. Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co. v British Am.
Tobacco Serv. Ltd. [2011] FCA 1051 (Austl.) (Greenwood J found that word
trademarks for cigarettes held greater significance than other features of a tobacco
trademark because of the restrictions on advertising and point of sale display of
cigarette packets).
24. MARLBORO CIGARETTE PACKET, Registration No. 1173048
(describing the image on Australian registered trademark number 1173048—a
Marlboro cigarette packet—as “coat-of-arms is ltrs in shield supported by 2 horses
in cigarette packet”).
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including trademarks, contribute to the nature and extent of that
harm?
Tobacco usage will be the direct cause of death of an estimated
one billion people in the current century.25 The Australian death toll
from tobacco is about 15,000 per annum.26 The evidence that tobacco
will kill about fifty percent of its long-term users is widely
accepted.27 It is also widely accepted that nicotine is highly addictive.
According to the Royal College of Physicians and the U.S. Surgeon
General, tobacco’s physiological addictiveness is on par with that of
heroin or cocaine.28 Therefore any use of tobacco contributes to the
likelihood of further use, which is likely to result in physiological
addictiveness relatively quickly. More critically, the initial use of
tobacco is overwhelmingly by those who are not yet adults.29 The

25. Fact Sheet No. 339, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ (updated July 2013) [hereinafter WHO Fact Sheet
No. 339].
26. Deaths Attributable to Tobacco by Disease Category, TOBACCO IN
AUSTRALIA:
FACTS
AND
ISSUES
ch.
3.30
(2012),
http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/chapter-3-health-effects/3-30-deathsattributable-to-tobacco-by-disease-cat/.
27. WHO Fact Sheet No. 339, supra note 25.
28. SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE
ADDICTION vi (1998), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/
NNBBZD.pdf; Harm Reduction in Nicotine Addiction: Helping People Who Can’t
Quit, TOBACCO ADVISORY GROUP ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS 66 (2007),
available
at
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/sites/default/files/documents/harmreduction-nicotine-addiction.pdf. In the pleadings to the Australian High Court
challenge to the plain packaging legislation, Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd and
British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd denied that nicotine is physiologically
addictive. Van Nelle Tabak Nederland & Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd v
Commonwealth: Submissions in Reply [2012] HCA 43, 24 (No. S399 of 2011)
(Austl.). Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd simply admitted that “smoking can be
characterised as addictive in that some people may find it difficult to stop
smoking.” Id. at 10(c). It otherwise denied the Australian government’s claim of
physiological addiction. Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd would also only admit
that “public health authorities have concluded that smoking is a cause of lung
cancer and other diseases in smokers” and that “statistics show that smokers are
more likely than non-smokers to develop lung cancer and certain other diseases.”
Id. at 10(a), (b). It otherwise denied the Commonwealth’s allegations that smoking
causes a number of diseases that were listed in the Commonwealth’s pleadings. Id.
at 10(d).
29. Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth and Young Adults: A Report of the
Surgeon General, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 3 (2012) [hereinafter
Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth].
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tobacco industry’s business model is almost completely dependent
on the physiological addiction of minors to tobacco products and that
physiological addiction continuing into adulthood.30 About eightyeight percent of cigarette smokers were smokers before reaching
adulthood.31 Very few adults choose to become established smokers
after they reach adulthood. Without the addiction of minors, the
tobacco problem would be dramatically reduced.32
Hence, the nature of the harm from tobacco flows from long-term
use, and the extent of the harm is extreme. Additionally, the nature
and extent of the harm is primarily attributable to use commencing
when people are minors. One further fact about the harm of tobacco
use and prevention of it might also be useful. If adults smoke, the
chances of their children smoking increase on average by fifty
percent.33 Every time an adult gives up, the chances of his or her
children starting to smoke decrease. For every child who does not
smoke and therefore does not smoke as an adult, the odds of his or
her children smoking are decreased by fifty percent compared to the
position if the parent had become a smoker. The time frame in which
the success of a tobacco control measure is assessed must take into
account the issues mentioned above. The nature of the product is also
such that there is only one possible broad regulatory response of
government to tobacco: one aimed at total abstinence because of the
addictive nature of the product.
The legitimate interest of governments in this issue is considerable
for social and economic reasons.34 “Government” in this context not
only has a legitimate interest35 of its own due to its obligations to
oversee the social development of its nation, the health of its citizens,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., id. at 4 (“[A]dolescents can become dependent at even low levels
of consumption . . . because the adolescent brain is still developing, it may be more
susceptible and receptive to nicotine than the adult brain.”); The Seven Dwarves: I
Believe That Nicotine Is Not Addictive (uploaded Nov. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQUNk5meJHs.
33. Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth, supra note 29, at 455.
34. DAVID J. COLLINS & HELEN M. LAPSLEY, THE COSTS OF TOBACCO,
ALCOHOL AND ILLICIT DRUG ABUSE TO AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY IN 2004/05 xi
(2008) (finding the total social costs of tobacco to be 31.5 billion AUD in 2004 and
2005).
35. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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and its national budget,36 but it also has a legitimate interest as the
representative of consumers and non-consumers.37
Unusually, in the context of commerce and trademarks, where
consumption or facilitating consumption is the usual objective,
governments have a very keen interest in the non-consumption of
tobacco, especially by minors. Non-consumers have a legitimate
interest in the non-consumption by others because of the economic
and social costs imposed by tobacco use,38 as well as in their own
non-consumption by avoiding passive smoking.39 Governments have
other legitimate interests in regulating the use of signs, which we
discuss later.40

C. EVIDENCE ABOUT PLAIN PACKAGING
This article does not propose to engage in an exhaustive
examination of the evidence that plain packaging will achieve its
legislative objectives. However, it is correct to say that the main
target of the plain packaging legislation is minors.41 If they refrain
from smoking, they will continue to do so into adulthood. There may
also be direct effects on usage by current smokers. For example, one
study in the United Kingdom has suggested that plain packaging
would result in about 500,000 current smokers in the United
Kingdom ceasing to smoke over about a two-year period.42 However,
36. See COLLINS & LAPSLEY, supra note 34, at 71 (outlining the impact of
tobacco abuse on the federal government budget).
37. See id. at 16 (discussing the harm to other citizens when the government
must concentrate its services on those who are addicted to various forms of drugs).
38. Id. at 8.
39. See generally The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to
Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., 24 (2006), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/
secondhandsmoke/fullreport.pdf (acknowledging that the harmful effects of
passive smoking are widely documented).
40. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
41. See Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, NAT’L PREVENTATIVE
HEALTH TASKFORCE (2009), available at http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/
internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/nphs-roadmap/$File/nphsroadmap.pdf [hereinafter Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020] (developing
anti-smoking strategies to combat tobacco companies’ targeting of minors).
42. Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products Would Cut Smoking, Experts Say,
SCIENCE DAILY, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/01/
130123115354.htm. We regard this reduction as both large and significant. If
500,000 ceased smoking, this reduction would translate to about 250,000 fewer
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the study concluded that the main impact of plain packaging would
be on reductions in the uptake of smoking by minors.43
We will refer to additional evidence later in this article to indicate
why the State has an interest in plain packaging.44 Again, this
reference to the evidence will not be exhaustive by any means, but
indicative of the type of evidence that is available. Much of the
evidence relates to documents obtained from tobacco companies
themselves about the marketing uses to which they put their
packaging and also the knowledge that tobacco companies had of the
dangers of their products despite their public denials.45 Other
evidence relates to research done over thirty years on the likely
effects of plain packaging.46

III. PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION OF TRIPS
There are a number of principles relevant to the process of
interpretation of international treaties and TRIPS in particular.
Scholars have discussed these principles in some detail elsewhere,47
and this article will not add substantially to that discussion. In
essence, an interpretation of TRIPS must have due regard to the
context of the terms of the treaty and the object and purpose of the
treaty, as well as other relevant rules of international law, as per
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. According to Paragraph 1 of
Article 31, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
deaths from tobacco usage. Whether that number of deaths is “large” is probably a
normative conclusion on our part.
43. Id.
44. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
45. See Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, UNIV. CAL. S.F.,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/ (listing over “14 million documents created by major
tobacco companies related to their advertising, manufacturing, marketing, sales
and scientific research activities”).
46. See, e.g., Plain Packaging: The Facts, CANCER COUNCIL VICTORIA,
http://www.cancervic.org.au/plainfacts/ (arguing that the use of fewer design
elements on cigarette packs would diminish the positive perceptions that people
have about smoking).
47. See, e.g., Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO
Appellate Body, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 605, 607–08 (2010) (stating that Article 3.2 of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding allows for use of customary rules of
treaty interpretation, including those in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties); MICHELLE T. GRANDO, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACTFINDING IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2009).
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with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”48 Paragraph
3(c) of Article 31 then provides other sources that may assist in the
interpretation of a treaty: “There shall be taken into account, together
with the context: any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.”49
In addition, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention permits reference
to supplementary materials such as the preparatory works in some
circumstances:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 50

Starting an analysis by initial reference to a narrowly literal
meaning of TRIPS runs the risk of being too formalistic in the
interpretation of the words in the relevant provisions.51 On the other
hand, starting with an overarching narrative based on legal theory
and statements about international norms of trademark use, without
regard to relevant international legal and other interpretive
considerations, runs the risk of misunderstanding what was actually
agreed upon at the WTO. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
mandates that parties establish the meaning of the words used and
then give effect to them; it does not license disregarding them or
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 32.
51. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 164, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005) (“[D]ictionaries, alone, are not necessarily capable of resolving complex
questions of interpretation.”); Appellate Body Report, United States – Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, ¶ 59, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004) (“[D]ictionary definitions
have their limitations in revealing the ordinary meaning of a term.”); cf. Appellate
Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
¶ 248, WT/DS217/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003) (“[D]ictionaries are important guides to,
but not dispositive statements of, definitions of words in agreements and legal
documents.”).
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going beyond them. At some point, the interpretation of a treaty must
marry the text and principles allegedly underlying the text to
ascertain the meaning of TRIPS Article 20.
This analysis starts with a discussion of overarching principles and
attempts to integrate relevant principles given the wording of the
TRIPS Agreement itself. In part, it does so because prior interpretive
approaches have been criticized for their allegedly excessive
formalism.52 In the end, formalistic interpretations need to be
supported by context, object, and purpose; but asserted context,
object, and purpose also need to be supported by the actual words of
the agreement and a coherent theoretical structure. Violence to the
meaning of TRIPS can be inflicted by undue formalism. It can also
be inflicted by attempts to capture its meaning using principles or
heuristics of interpretation that fail to reflect the nuances in the text
and the reconciliation of competing approaches, principles, and
interests implicit in the wording of the agreement.53

A. RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND POWERS
The debate about the meaning of Article 20 revolves around the
nature of the entitlements that TRIPS confers on trademark owners.
TRIPS certainly confers some exclusive rights on trademark owners.
These rights are expressed in Article 16 and via Article 2, which
incorporates Article 6bis of the Paris Convention into TRIPS. Article
16(1) confers a right on owners of registered trademarks to prevent
others from using their trademarks where such use would likely lead
to confusion.54 In addition, Article 255 and Articles 16(2) and (3)56
52. See Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the
Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1213
(2013) (arguing that the TRIPS Agreements should be given a contextual
interpretation rather than a more formalistic one).
53. Negotiations on the text and content of TRIPS began in April 1989 and
ended in December 1993. Some of the complexity of the agreement is
demonstrated by the very first sentence of the Preamble to TRIPS which states, in
part, as follows:
Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.

TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
54. See id. art. 16(1) (“The owner of a registered trademark shall have the
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from
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confer Article 6bis rights on owners of well-known trademarks,
whether registered or not, to prevent the use of those trademarks by
others in certain circumstances.
These express rights are expressed in negative terms and a panel
decision of the WTO has said as much.57 Considered in and of
themselves, these rights do not also confer a right to use registered or
well known trademarks. It is the case, however, that the rights of
excluding third parties from using certain trademarks conferred by
Article 16 and Article 2 have the effect of conferring on owners of
using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which
are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered
where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an
identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be
presumed. The rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights,
nor shall they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the
basis of use.”).
55. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6, March
20, 1883, as revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], incorporated into
TRIPS Agreement art. 2 (“The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their
legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel
the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark
considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be
well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the
benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a
reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create
confusion therewith.”).
56. TRIPS Agreement arts. 16(2), 16(3) (“Article 6bis of the Paris Convention
(1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to services. In determining whether a
trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the knowledge of the
trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member
concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the
trademark . . . . Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis
mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a
trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those
goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or services and
the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner
of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.”).
57. Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications For Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210,
WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter European Communities – Trademarks
and Geographical Indications] (confirming that the TRIPS Agreement does not
give positive rights to use, but instead grants negative rights to prevent “certain
acts”).
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registered and well known trademarks an exclusive privilege of using
those trademarks.58 At this point, before going on to consider the
extent to which this exclusive privilege may permissibly be restricted
by government action, some precision in the definition of terms is
very necessary. Shifting definitions in the course of an explanation of
TRIPS will inevitably lead to errors in interpretation.
The expressions “rights” and “privilege” in this context are drawn
from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s well known discussion of these
concepts.59 According to Hohfeld, property consists of a web of
relationships between people rather than some identifiable tangible
or intangible “thing,” and the legal nature of property depends
entirely on the actions or lack of action of people rather than the
“thing” itself, and those actions depend on the nature of the legal
relationships in question.60 Consequently, close attention needs to be
paid to the nature of any relationship relevant to consideration of the
particular property in question. Different relationships have different
implications for the nature of the property.61
Additionally, Hohfeld’s taxonomy distinguishes between a right
and a privilege. A right can be said to exist when there is a
corresponding duty on another pertaining to the subject matter of the
right.62 Thus, the existence of a duty on certain parties not to interfere
with (or use) some thing demonstrates the existence of another’s
right to exclude them from (use of) that thing.63 For example, a duty
of third parties not to use a trademark correlates to the right of the
trademark owner to exclude third parties from use of that trademark.
In order to distinguish it more clearly from a privilege, a right in this
sense can be described as a “claim” or a “claim right,” because the

58. TRIPS Agreement arts. 2, 16.
59. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 2001).
60. Id. at 26, 75–76.
61. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 182 (1986)
[hereinafter RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM] (emphasizing the relational
character of rights).
62. HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 13.
63. Although it is widely accepted that not all rights are negative in this
fashion, as noted above, trademark owners’ rights to exclude others from using a
trademark are negative rights. Hence there is no need to consider the general form
of the duties that might correspond to positive rights.
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right holder enjoys a claim against those who owe the duty.64
A privilege (also known as a liberty) is not a right in this strict
sense, but a legal permission to engage in conduct (or to refrain from
engaging in that conduct). A person enjoys the privilege of doing
something if no other person has a claim right that the first person
not do that thing.65 The privilege of using a trademark could also be
described as the absence of a claim right in anyone else to prevent
use of that trademark. Hohfeld described such a relationship as one
where one party has the privilege and others have a correlative “noright” that the party refrain from exercising that privilege.66
In the absence of any trademark legislation, every person would
have the privilege of using a sign as a trademark. More accurately,
everyone would have the privilege of attempting to use it as a
trademark. Ultimately, if no right exists to exclude third parties from
using a sign, that privilege becomes meaningless in a trademark
context as the sign will be incapable of distinguishing goods from
other goods if multiple parties have the privilege of using that sign
and actually exercise that privilege.67 In that sense, the right of
exclusion is fundamental to the very existence of trademarks. Each
nation has its own rules about the point at which an individual
acquires the right of exclusion and, as a consequence, usually
acquires a privilege of using a sign as a trademark to the exclusion of
others. For example, in countries with a “first-to-file” system,
ownership flows to the first individual to seek registration. In
countries with a “first-to-use” system, ownership flows from being
either the first to use a trademark and then seek registration on that
basis or, in the absence of use by anyone, the first to seek
registration. In that sense, everybody has the privilege of being the
first to file or the first to use and to thereby obtain the exclusive
privilege of use by denying everyone else’s privilege of use through
a right of exclusion while retaining their own pre-existing privilege
of use. In addition, certain provisions of the Paris Convention that
are incorporated into TRIPS68 effectively place a duty on government
64. HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 13.
65. Id. at 14, 17.
66. Id. at 14.
67. It is possible for a trademark to be owned jointly, but it certainly cannot be
owned by everybody.
68. TRIPS Agreement art. 2(1) (requiring adherence to relevant provisions of
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to accept registration in certain circumstances, or at least not to deny
registration on the basis of certain circumstances.69 These provisions,
therefore, establish a right to acquire registration,70 and registration,
in turn, leads to obtaining the right of exclusion which has the effect
of conferring an exclusive privilege of use.
Hohfeld also refers to powers pursuant to which a person may
alter legal relations.71 For example, a trademark owner has the power
to assign ownership of a trademark, resulting in a change of legal
relations whereby the assignee acquires both the right to exclude and
the privilege of using while the assignor gives up both that right and
that privilege.72 If the trademark owner licenses the use of the
trademark, it is using its power to confer a privilege on the licensee,
and depending on the terms of the license and domestic legislation
concerning the rights of an exclusive licensee, a right to exclude third
parties.73 One consequence of the exercise of a power may be the
imposition of duties: for instance, a trader who exercises the power
to assign a trademark comes under a duty, owed to the assignee, not
to use the trademark.74
The property of a trademark owner consists of the web of
relationships such as rights and duties, privileges and “no-right,” and
powers and liabilities surrounding the trademark. The relationships
are interrelated in the sense that, to understand the nature of the
property, one needs to understand how all the relationships interact.
A critical point to remember is that property is about a multitude of
relationships between different parties rather than general slogans
such as that “trademarks were made to be used.”
the Paris Convention).
69. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6quinquies (requiring that
“Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be accepted for
filing and protected as is in the other countries of the Union, subject to the
reservations indicated in this Article”); id. art. 7 (restricting the capacity to deny
registration of trademarks on the basis of the nature of the goods in respect of
which registration is sought).
70. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 15(2).
71. HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 21.
72. See id. at 22 (analyzing the general nature of an assignment of property).
73. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 26 (Austl.) (outlining the
agreements between trademark owner and licensees).
74. See generally HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27–32, 79–81, 94–98
(1994) (discussing the capacity of legal actors to change what duties are owed by
the exercise of powers).
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B. LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND PRIVILEGES
The right to exclude others from using a trademark creates the
conditions under which a trademark owner obtains both the exclusive
privilege of using the trademark as a trademark and the power to
authorize others, such as licensees, to use the trademark exclusively.
Nevertheless, claim rights are rarely, if ever, absolute.75 There will
almost invariably be exceptions to claim rights. For example, even a
claim right not to be killed is not absolute: self-defense, or acts of
war permitted by international law, may justify killing another.
Similarly, a privilege may be defeasible in the sense that it might be
taken away partially or completely by a third party who comes to
enjoy a claim right to prevent the conduct that was the subject matter
of the privilege.76
“Legitimate interests” have a key role to play in understanding the
scope of rights and privileges, as well as the circumstances in which
they may be defeated, according to both general legal theory and in
the interpretation of TRIPS. In fact, TRIPS and other WTO
agreements frequently refer to “rights” and “legitimate interests.”77
The latter are separate from rights, although related to them in
important ways. While some scholars may refer to “privileges” and
“rights” as “legitimate interests,”78 neither TRIPS nor any of the
influential legal theorists in the area does so.79 There may be a
75. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 82–122 (1990).
76. Id.
77. There are 131 references to “right” or “rights” in TRIPS alone. There are
nine references to legitimate interests in TRIPS. For references to these things in
other WTO agreements, see, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art.
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement];
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement]; Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex C(1)(d), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; TBT Agreement, supra art. 5.2.4.
78. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1190 (arguing that rights are a
form of legitimate interest, and suggesting that privileges and legitimate interests
are the same thing); id. at 1190 n.180 (“[A] right is a legitimate interest, but not all
legitimate interests are rights.”).
79. See, e.g., HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 12–16 (discussing in detail the
difference between a claim right and a privilege, without equating either with a
legitimate interest); THOMSON, supra note 75, at 39–47 (describing the relationship
between “rights” and “privileges” without equating either with “legitimate
interests”); RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 165–92
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legitimate interest in using a trademark, a privilege of using a
trademark, or even a right to use a trademark (although we reject that
latter proposition) but the suggestion that there is a legitimate interest
to use a trademark80 is unusual in both a formalistic and a theoretical
sense. As the following paragraphs will explain, this is because
interests are either the basis for the existence of a duty to protect
those interests via a claim right or the basis of a “no-right” on the
part of others that one refrain from the exercise of a privilege of
advancing those interests.
A well accepted theoretical approach is that a duty to protect or
promote a legitimate interest may exist when the balance of reasons
favors requiring a third party to protect or promote that interest. The
existence of such a duty means also the existence of a claim right as
the correlate of that duty. While interests may, in this way, be the
basis of rights, they are not rights in themselves.81 Considerations in
favor of the existence of a right include the importance of the
legitimate interest underlying it and the feasibility of requiring others
to protect or promote that interest.82 Considerations against requiring
another to protect a legitimate interest may be that it is too onerous to
impose such a demand upon that other party, or that the other party
itself has some interest to protect that conflicts with the interest of
(discussing the nature of rights including the capacity to have rights and the
relation between rights, duties, and interests).
80. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1197 (arguing that limitations on
trademark owners’ rights are important, but that these show only that there is no
absolute or explicit right to use a trademark, and do “not preclude . . . rights or
interests to . . . use a trademark”).
81. Raz describes interests as the “basis” of rights: “The specific role of right
in practical thinking is . . . the grounding of duties in the interests of other beings.”
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 180. Raz states that X has a
right only if it is the case that some interest of X is a sufficient reason for holding
some other person to be under a duty to protect or promote that interest. Id. at 166,
170–71, 183. Conversely he notes that when “conflicting considerations altogether
defeat the interests of the would-be right-holder, or when they weaken their force
and no one could justifiably be held to be obligated on account of those interests,
then there is no right.” Id. at 184.
82. See John Tasioulas, Taking the Rights Out of Human Rights, 120 ETHICS
647, 669–72 (2010) (discussing “the judgments of feasibility that must be made in
assessing whether an interest generates a . . . right”); John Tasioulas, The Moral
Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT 75, 76–
77, 91–92 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007) (discussing “feasible institutional design” as
a crucial consideration in identifying the existence of rights).
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the party seeking to impose a duty upon it.83 If an interest is
legitimate, and hence worthy of respect, but it is not reasonable to
require another to protect that interest, then no right exists. However,
a privilege of pursuing the interest may still exist, whereby others
have no duty that is owed to the privilege holder but equally have no
right to the non-exercise of the privilege by the privilege holder.
Applying this analysis of rights, privileges, and interests to the
right of exclusion conferred on trademark owners, we note that (1) an
owner of a trademark has a legitimate interest that should be
protected, usually as a consequence of registration; (2) protection of
that interest is feasible (e.g., because there is an adequately
functioning legal system); and (3) it is not too onerous to expect third
parties to refrain from using that trademark. An example in the
trademark context in which the existence of a conflicting legitimate
interest precludes the existence of a right of exclusion is honest
concurrent use.84 The trademark owner has an interest to be
respected—namely, an interest in excluding others from using its
trademark or a similar one likely to lead to confusion. However, the
law considers it too onerous to require the honest concurrent user to
refrain from using a similar trademark that is likely to lead to
confusion. Consequently, both have the privilege of using similar
trademarks. Note that the privilege granted to the honest concurrent
user is dependent upon that user’s relationship with the trademark
owner and is restricted to that particular user. It is not a privilege
granted to the world at large.
In circumstances where a party enjoys the exercise of a privilege
vís-a-vís another party, there may come a point at which that other
83. Even among theorists who otherwise differ from Raz on certain details of
the analysis of rights, the notion that the existence of a duty depends in part on
how onerous it would be to fulfill the duty, and also on the strength of any
conflicting legitimate interests, is widely accepted. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Does
Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue, 19 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
655, 675–77 (2000) (arguing that persons have a legitimate interest in giving
weight to their own special concerns and projects, but that this is consistent with a
duty to care for those things that are associated with them and are thereby
implicated in their own concerns and projects); Jan Narveson, We Don’t Owe
Them a Thing! A Tough-Minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway
Needy, 86 MONIST 419, 425, 430 (2003) (arguing that the existence of a posited
duty depends upon the costs of fulfilling that duty).
84. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 44(3) (Austl.).
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party has a weightier legitimate interest that should be respected and
for which it is feasible and not too onerous to require its protection.
At that point, a duty may then be owed to that other party. It will
then move from having a “no-right” to having a claim right to restrict
the exercise of the privilege. In the context of plain packaging, the
privilege of use of a tobacco trademark for retail purposes is
significantly restricted by government measures. As we will go on to
argue, the issue is whether the government has sufficient legitimate
interests to underpin a claim right to this effect. 85 First, however, we
need to relate the theoretical analysis above to the text of the TRIPS
Agreement.

C. LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND TRIPS
Obviously, the WTO Members did not expressly adopt the
approach of contemporary legal theory when it adopted the terms
“rights” and “legitimate interests,” but there is considerable evidence
to suggest that the Members adopted a similar approach. After all,
the legal theorists to whom we have referred did not set out to invent
new concepts, but rather to provide a useful analysis of the concepts
already used in the law.86 It is therefore no surprise that their
85. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
86. See, e.g., HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 4 (describing his goal as “aid[ing] in
the understanding and in the solution of practical, everyday problems of the law”);
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 165 (describing the author’s
account of rights, and of the relationship between rights, duties, and interests, as an
“attempt to capture the way the term is used in legal, political and moral writing
and discourse”). Although Raz’s account of the relationship between rights and
duties is distinctive in its analytical clarity, it draws on a philosophical tradition
extending back at least to Kant. Compare id. at 188–90 (discussing the relationship
between his account of rights and the ideal of respect for persons: “Respecting a
person consists in giving appropriate weight to his interests . . . . [W]e respect
others by giving proper weight to their interests . . . . [T]he duty of respect for
persons . . . is grounded on the intrinsic desirability of the well-being of persons”),
and JOSEPH RAZ, VALUE, RESPECT AND ATTACHMENT 130, 136 (2001)
(characterizing his account of respect for persons as “similar to Kant’s,” and
particularly to Kant’s notion of persons as “ends in themselves”), with IMMANUEL
KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36–37 (Allen W. Wood
ed., 2002) (1785) (discussing persons as ends in themselves, who therefore impose
limits upon our permissible choices, that is, duties, which we have seen correlate,
in turn, with rights). Many contemporary theorists who disagree with other aspects
of Raz’s legal and moral philosophy nevertheless accept the soundness of his
analysis of the relationship between interests, duties, and rights. See, e.g., Jeremy
Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL.
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accounts should be closely aligned with the WTO’s approach to such
matters. There is no doubt that the WTO differentiated between the
two concepts and employed them both frequently in the drafting of
TRIPS; indeed, the terms “rights” and “legitimate interests” appear
many times in TRIPS.87 The concept of legitimate (commercial)
interests appears in the GATT 1947—the precursor to the creation of
the WTO.88 The term is also used in other WTO agreements.89
As already explained, legitimate interests are different from but
related to legal rights. In the context of TRIPS, WTO panels and
Appellate Body have considered their nature on two notable
occasions. In Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products,90 the Panel considered whether an exception to the rights
of a patent owner complied with Article 30 of TRIPS, which requires
a consideration of the legitimate interests of right holders and those
of third parties.
The Panel had this to say on the concept:
7.70 The negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement itself casts no
further illumination on the meaning of the term “legitimate interests,” but
the negotiating history of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, from
which the text of the third condition was clearly drawn, does tend to
affirm the Panel’s interpretation of that term. With regard to the TRIPS
negotiations themselves, the meaning of several important drafting
changes turns out to be equivocal upon closer examination. The
negotiating records of the TRIPS Agreement itself show that the first
drafts of the provision that was to become Article 30 contemplated
authorizing “limited exceptions” that would be defined by an illustrative
list of exceptions - private use, scientific use, prior use, a traditional
exception for pharmacists, and the like. Eventually, this illustrative list
approach was abandoned in favour of a more general authorization
L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989) (“The Morality of Freedom also has two excellent
chapters on how to understand the concept of individual rights. These chapters . . .
present what has become known as the Interest Theory of rights . . . . [T]he Interest
Theory provides the best account we have of the language of rights in political
philosophy.”).
87. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 26, 30, 31, 34.
88. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. X(1), VXII(4)(d), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
89. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 26, 30, 31, 34; GATT arts. X(1),
XVII(4)(d); TBT Agreement art. 5.2.4; TRIMs Agreement art. 6; SPS Agreement
arts. Annex B(11)(b), Annex C(1)(d), 1995.
90. Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
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following the outlines of the present Article 30. The negotiating records
of the TRIPS Agreement give no explanation of the reason for this
decision.
7.71 The text of the present, more general version of Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement was obviously based on the text of Article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention. Berne Article 9(2) deals with exceptions to the
copyright holder’s right to exclude reproduction of its copyrighted work
without permission. The text of Article 9(2) is as follows:
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
permit the reproduction of [literary and artistic] works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”
The text of Berne Article 9(2) was not adopted into Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement without change. Whereas the final condition in Berne
Article 9(2) (“legitimate interests”) simply refers to the legitimate
interests of the author, the TRIPS negotiators added in Article 30 the
instruction that account must be taken of “the legitimate interests of third
parties”. Absent further explanation in the records of the TRIPS
negotiations, however, the Panel was not able to attach a substantive
meaning to this change other than what is already obvious in the text
itself, namely that the reference to the “legitimate interests of third
parties” makes sense only if the term “legitimate interests” is construed as
a concept broader than legal interests.91
7.73 In sum, after consideration of the ordinary meaning of the term
“legitimate interests” as it is used in Article 30, the Panel was unable to
accept the EC’s [European Communities’] interpretation of that term as
referring to legal interests pursuant to Article 28.1. Accordingly, the Panel
was unable to accept the primary EC argument with regard to the third
condition of Article 30. It found that the EC argument based solely on the
patent owner’s legal rights pursuant to Article 28.1, without reference to
any more particular normative claims of interest, did not raise a relevant
claim of non-compliance with the third condition of Article 30.92

In European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs,
the Panel stated that it agreed with the panel’s view in Canada –
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products that, in the context of
91. Id. ¶¶ 7.70–7.71.
92. See id. ¶ 7.73.
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trademarks, the term “legitimate interest . . . must be defined as it is
often used in legal discourse—as a normative claim calling for
protection of interests that are “justifiable” in the sense that they are
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.”93 The
quotes from these WTO panels state a view of legitimate interests
that is very similar, if not identical, to the normative claim calling for
protection of interests that are identifiable by reference to public
policies or social norms.
The interesting point relating to TRIPS is that it is clearly the case
that for every provision that expressly uses the term “legitimate
interests” in Part II of TRIPS dealing with the availability, scope, and
use of intellectual property rights, the concept of legitimate interests
is used to help define the scope of an intellectual property right or
rights by helping to ascertain the nature of the rights and carve out
the exceptions to what is expressly stated to be a right or rights. 94
This approach is entirely consistent with the proposition that the
existence of a legitimate interest may suggest the desirability of a
duty and thus result in the existence of a right. In other words, in
terms of rights theory, the scope of the legitimate interest assists in
establishing the scope of the right. There is no justification for a right
that goes well beyond the legitimate interest of the right holder, and
so the right that is expressed is subject to limitation by reference to
that principle.95
In addition, a number of the TRIPS provisions refer to the
legitimate interests of parties other than right holders. These
legitimate interests are also relevant to the process of defining
allowable exceptions to the exclusive rights of intellectual property
holders. Examples of the approach to legitimate interests in TRIPS
93. European Communities – Trademarks and Geographical Indications,
supra note 57, ¶ 7.663 citing Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) ¶ 7.69 (emphasis added).
The emphasis is added here because TRIPS Agreement Article 20 refers to
encumbrances by special requirements that are unjustifiable. While intellectual
property law itself provides no significant contribution to the concept of
“unjustifiability” in the context of Article 20, the discussion of rights, privileges,
and legitimate interests most assuredly does.
94. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17 (providing “limited exceptions to the
rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms”).
95. See generally RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 184
(discussing the relationship between interests and the scope of rights).
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are easy to find. For example, Article 13, which relates to copyright,
provides that “[m]embers shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder.”96 In the context of Article
13, the legitimate interests of third parties are not considered, but the
situation alters when considering Article 30, which concerns patents:
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”97 In
the context of registered designs, as with patents, both the legitimate
interests of right holders and third parties are relevant in Article
26(2):
Members may provide limited exceptions to the protection of industrial
designs, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with
the normal exploitation of protected industrial designs and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the
protected design, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.98

For the sake of completeness and because it will be referred to
later, Article 17 which relates to exceptions to trademarks states,
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by
a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such
exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the
trademark and of third parties.”99
Article 17 takes into account both the interests of third parties and
the interests of a trademark owner in a manner that is far more
deferential to the interests of third parties than the other exception
clauses. For example, there is no reference to unreasonable prejudice
of legitimate interests or normal exploitation of the trademark or
even “certain special cases.”
In terms of rights theory, this approach in TRIPS to the legitimate
96.
97.
98.
99.

TRIPS Agreement art. 13.
Id. art. 30.
Id. art. 26(2).
Id. art. 17.
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interests of third parties makes perfect sense. The legitimate interests
of the third parties are a basis for considering whether there exists a
right to exclude others from using copyrighted or patented subjectmatter, designs, and trademarks. A right exists when the balance of
reasons requires others to respect the putative right holder’s interest
in excluding others’ use. If others also have legitimate interests, these
interests are the basis of the argument that it is not reasonable to
confer the claim right to exclude use by those others in
circumstances where the exercise of that right would unduly impinge
on their legitimate interests.
In the context of the above exceptions, if an exception to the right
is created, the right holders still have the privilege of using their
copyright material, their patented invention, their registered design,
or their trademark in the circumstances identified by the exception,
but they do not have a claim right to prevent others from doing so.
However, while exceptions to the exclusive rights simply expand the
number of traders who may have the privilege of use in the
circumstances identified by the exception, the privilege of using the
intellectual property in question is also subject to government
regulation. We now turn to this point.

IV. A GOVERNMENT’S POWER AT
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO RESTRICT THE
PRIVILEGE OF USE OF TRADEMARKS
One of the critical issues in the interpretation of TRIPS is the
extent to which governments may restrict the privilege of using
trademarks even though they may still acknowledge the right to
exclude and a right to registration. The starting point from an
international legal perspective is that, absent international
agreements to the contrary, a sovereign government enjoys
untrammeled power to make a determination via its own internal
processes that its legitimate interests justify it asserting a claim right
to the non-use of a trademark owner’s intellectual property.100 A
100. International agreements are of course not the only source of international
law, but no one has argued that there are principles of customary international law
which prohibit restricting trademarks owners from using their trademarks. And
while there may be internal limitations on government power imposed by
constitutional restrictions, that is a matter for the domestic jurisdiction of each
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government may thereby impose a duty upon the trademark owner
not to use intellectual property, correlative with the asserted right. As
a government has an untrammeled power to confer such a right upon
itself, the privilege holder is liable to the exercise of that power.101
Hence, the duty that correlates with the right can be and is imposed.
A shorthand way of expressing this proposition is that a government
has the power to impose a duty on its corporate and personal citizens,
in this case a duty not to use the intellectual property in question.
Once a state becomes a party to a binding international agreement
such as TRIPS, some of this power may be foregone. For instance, a
government may voluntarily surrender its power to impose certain
sorts of duties upon the owners of intellectual property rights. It may
also surrender its power to determine the scope of its legitimate
interests using only its own internal processes, and thereby surrender
the power to determine the rights that it may assert on the basis of
those interests.102 If, in this fashion, a government has surrendered
some of its otherwise complete power to assert the existence of an
nation. In addition, the process by which a government identifies the legitimate
interests that it considers relevant and defines the rights that it confers upon itself is
also a matter for the internal political processes of the nation in question. In
Australia’s case, these processes are those of a representative democracy, and are
underpinned by the Constitution. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ss 7, 24 (ensuring
popular election of the parliament); id. s 64 (ensuring the accountability of the
executive government to the parliament). The language of “assertion” does not
imply arbitrariness. In Australia, discussion of plain packaging occurred over a
number of years. In 2008 the government established a National Preventative
Health Taskforce, which recommended plain packaging in its report. Australia:
The Healthiest Country by 2020, supra note 41, at 17–18. The then government
accepted the recommendation, Taking Preventative Action – A Response to
Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, NAT’L PREVENTATIVE HEALTH
TASKFORCE 65–67 (2010), and made an election promise to implement it. The
issue was discussed widely during the relevant election campaign for 2010. After
the election, the legislation was passed with bi-partisan political support and the
almost unanimous support of every member of both houses of parliament. Cth,
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 10 Nov. 2011, 8917 (Concetta Fierravanti-Wells,
Senator) (Austl.) (highlighting, in the third and final reading of the legislation in
the Australian Senate, that the legislation enjoyed the support of all political parties
and most independents in the two houses of parliament, and as a result, would pass
on the voices without a formal vote in Parliament).
101. See HOHFELD, supra note 59, at 23–27 (explaining that one party’s
enjoyment of a power must correlate with one or more other parties being liable to
having their legal relations changed by exercise of the power in question).
102. See discussion infra Part IV.B (citing Article 20 of TRIPS as an example
of this).
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interest that, in turn, justifies the imposition of a duty, it nevertheless
retains all power other than that which it has surrendered by way of
the relevant agreement. Partly for that reason, one principle of treaty
interpretation is that where there is ambiguity about the meaning of
an international agreement, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the
proposition that governments have retained their power and the
obligations of governments under the agreement will be construed
narrowly.103
The effect of the plain packaging legislation upon the use of
registered designs and patents pertaining to tobacco packaging
provides an example of the exercise of governmental power to
prevent the use of intellectual property rights by imposing a duty of
non-use.104 The requirement to sell tobacco in plain packaging means
103. See Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. 25
(ser. B) No. 12, at 25 (Nov. 21) (stating the principle in dubio mitius: “If the
wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several admissible
interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations for the parties
should be adopted”); Appellate Body Report, European Community – Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 165, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan.
16, 1998) (asserting that in applying the interpretive principle of in dubio mitius,
an interpreter cannot “lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation by
mandating [in that particular case] conformity or compliance with such standards,
guidelines and recommendations”) (approving OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
1278 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“The principle of in
dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the sovereignty of states.
If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less
onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the
territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions
upon the parties.”)); see also Nuclear Test Case (Austl. V. Fr), 1974 I.C.J. 267 (May
9); Access of Polish War Vessels to the Port of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1931
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 43, at 142 (Dec. 11); Case Concerning the Interpretation of the
Air Transport Services Agreement Between the United States of America and
France, 16 R.I.A.A. 5 (Arb. Trib. 1963); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented
Drugs Under the Trips Agreement, B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 132 (explaining the
principle in dubio mitius, which holds that it cannot be presumed that a treaty is
designed to place restrictions upon a state’s sovereignty as an independent state, as
states can only be taken to have consented to such restrictions to the extent
explicitly stated in the treaty).
104. See, e.g., AU Designs Data, Registration AU 323481 S, Design Number
2008152, IP AUSTRALIA (representing a “Ribbed pack” owned by British
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd.); AusPat Application Details, 2001258572:
Smoking Article Packaging, IP AUSTRALIA, (representing a patent for “Smoking
article packaging” owned by British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd.);
AusPat Application Details, 2007202891: Pack for Smoking Articles, IP
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that these designs and patents cannot be used at all; the privilege of
using them in retail packaging of tobacco is taken away by the
legislation. No doubt owners of registered designs registered them in
order to use them, and owners of patents paid the substantial costs of
registration (and the even greater costs of professional assistance to
do so) in order to do the same thing.105 However, while TRIPS
clearly envisages that patented subject matter be used, at least in the
context of certain sorts of relationships between patent owners and
other traders,106 TRIPS imposes very little restriction on the power of
governments to regulate the privilege of use, even though the
duration of the owner’s rights of exclusion is limited in time and a
“temporary” ban on use can exist for the entire duration of that right

AUSTRALIA (representing a patent for a “Pack for smoking articles” owned by
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd.).
105. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1185 (asserting that “people do
not register trademarks to obtain a certificate from a government; they register
them because they are using the trademark in commerce (or intend to)”). However,
the conduct of tobacco companies operating in Australia demonstrates that they do
value the right of exclusion that flows from registration, even in the absence of a
privilege of use. In 2005, British American Tobacco Australia Ltd and Philip
Morris (Australia) Ltd gave court-enforceable undertakings to the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission not to use “light” and “mild” descriptors
from all cigarettes produced for Australian consumers. See Undertaking to the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Given for the Purposes of
Section 87B of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 by British American Tobacco
Australian Limited ACN, 000 151 100 (2005). Despite being legally bound not to
use these descriptors since 2005, both companies have since renewed numerous
Australian trademarks containing those descriptors. E.g., PJ PETER JACKSON
EXTRA MILD, Registration No. 598946 (renewing Australian trademarks
containing such descriptors in 2010); ROTHMANS SPECIAL MILD R,
Registration No. 466640 (registering Trade Mark 466640, which contains the word
“mild,” in 2008); HI-LITE, Registration No. 1097625 (registering Hi-Lite in 2006
despite being aware that use of such a trade mark would immediately draw
regulatory action for misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce
contrary to the then s 52(1) of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974); Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52(1) (Austl.) (banning any corporation engaged in
trade or commerce to deploy “conduct that is misleading or deceptive”).
106. See TRIPS Agreement art. 31 (containing detailed provisions permitting
compulsory licenses where a trader is unable to obtain a license from a patent
owner on reasonable commercial terms, including particularly detailed provisions
to ensure that the owner of a patent which relies on an earlier patent in order to be
worked can use the subject matter of that earlier patent). This shows that it is the
intention of TRIPS that patented subject matter be used, at least in the context of
certain sorts of relationships between patent owners and other traders.
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to exclude use by others.107 TRIPS does impose some obligations on
governments to register designs and patents and thereby deprives
them of the power to refuse registration in the circumstances
prescribed by TRIPS,108 but altering governments’ powers in these
ways does not in itself limit their power to regulate the privilege of
use.
However, TRIPS imposes some limits on the power of
governments to impose a duty of non-use of designs and patents. For
example, any prohibition on use must not discriminate on a national
basis due to the national treatment requirements of TRIPS.109 A
government has a power to prohibit the use of designs and patents,
but not to selectively prevent the use of foreign designs and patents.
The plain packaging legislation applies to all designs and patents
equally and does not discriminate in this manner.
The rights of exclusion conferred on trademark owners by Articles
16 and 2 support an exclusive privilege of trademark use for
registered trademark owners and owners of well known trademarks.
As with the rights of exclusion associated with designs and patents,
however, these rights to exclusion do not tell us anything about the
extent to which governments can curtail that privilege of use,
including by imposing a duty on the trademark owner not to use a
trademark other than in the manner stated by law,110 or to refrain
from using the trademark altogether.111 The fact that a government,
by entering into an international agreement, has surrendered one
aspect of the power that it would otherwise enjoy to impose duties of
non-use upon trademark owners does not mean that it has
surrendered other aspects of that power. Similarly, the proposition
that trademark owners register trademarks so that they may use the
trademarks does not in itself mean that governments are required to
permit the trademarks’ use.
107. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 26(3), 33 (providing for a period of protection
of ten years for industrial designs in Article 26(3) and twenty years for patents in
Article 33).
108. Id. arts. 25, 27.
109. Id. arts. 1(3), 3.
110. See, e.g., TPP Act 2011 s 20; TPP Regulations reg 2.4.1 (imposing a duty
relating to the manner of use of word trademarks on the retail packaging of
tobacco).
111. See, e.g., TPP Act 2011 s 20 (imposing a duty not to use non-word
trademarks on the retail packaging of tobacco).
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From a trademark owner’s perspective, losing the privilege of
using a trademark may have the effect of depriving them of what
they perceive to be the primary benefit of the right to exclude others,
namely, their exclusive privilege of using the trademark. However,
simply stating this outcome from the trademark owner’s perspective
does not mean that the right to exclude confers not only an exclusive
privilege of use, but also a right to use (with TRIPS imposing a
corresponding duty on the government to permit that use). Nor does
it explain the circumstances in which, consistently with the TRIPS
regime, that privilege may be defeasible in the sense of being subject
to a claim right of some third party to prevent the exercise of the
privilege.
The distinction between a right and a privilege is crucial, as is the
proposition that Hohfeld’s analysis concerns relationships. For
example, there is a very big difference between governments
authorizing third parties to use trademarks, thereby conferring on
those third parties a privilege of use that impinges on the right of
exclusion, and governments limiting the use of trademarks by
anyone, including trademark owners, in particular circumstances.
The obligation under TRIPS to provide a right of exclusion is
obviously an international legal restriction on the power of
government to confer privileges on third parties to use trademarks. 112
However, the existence of a right of exclusion tells us nothing about
the nature and extent of the power that a government might continue
to possess to affirm its legitimate interests that justify its right that
certain signs not be used, and hence its imposition by way of
legislation of a duty not to use either signs or trademarks. For that
purpose, the relevant focus is not on a general concept of
“ownership” of trademarks. Nor is it on the importance of private
property.113 The focus must be on the relationship between
112. TRIPS Agreement art. 16.1.
113. See id. pmbl. (relevantly stating, “Desiring to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade . . . . Recognizing that intellectual property
rights are private rights [and r]ecognizing the underlying public policy objectives
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives”). There is nothing in the Preamble or
Part I of TRIPS that elevates the principle of protection of private property above
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government and the trademark owner and the connection between
that relationship and the grounds for the limitation of the privilege,
within the overall framework of the TRIPS regime.

A. A GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO RESTRICT THE PRIVILEGE OF USE
OF A TRADEMARK PRIOR TO TRIPS
Prior to becoming parties to TRIPS, governments enjoyed an
unlimited power to restrict the use of trademarks within their
jurisdictions in precisely the manner described above. Those writing
on behalf of tobacco companies or at the request of tobacco
companies have made claims of varying degrees to the contrary.114
These claims have been based on the proposition that adherence to
the Paris Convention necessarily imposed an international legal
requirement on governments to acknowledge a right of use. In turn,
these claims have been based on provisions of the Paris Convention
that require registration in certain circumstances. As we have already
other principles. If anything, the reverse is the case, with private property rights
protected only to the extent that they serve other principles, such as avoiding
distortions and impediments to international trade or the objectives set out in
Article 7. In that sense, TRIPS adopts an instrumentalist approach to intellectual
property rights.
114. See Alan Bennett, Submission on Plain Tobacco Packaging (Removing
Branding from Cigarette Packs) Bill 2009, TOBACCO LABELS ¶ 10.1 (2009),
available at http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Bennett-on-Plain-Tobacco-Packaging-Bill-2009-2010.pdf (“The Bill prohibits the
use and monopoly rights otherwise conferred on tobacco manufacturers by
Australian intellectual property law. Australian and overseas right owners are
adversely affected. The Bill is therefore in breach of the Paris Convention.”);
Memorandum from LALIVE to Phillip Morris Management, Why Plain Packaging
Is in Violation of WTO Members International Obligations Under TRIPS and the
Paris Convention ¶ 3 (July 19, 2009), available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/plainpackaging/documents/industry-responses/LALIVE_Analysis_23_July_2009.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum from LALIVE] (“Plain packaging measures would
however constitute a severe infringement on the right of tobacco trademark owners
to use their legally registered trademarks.”); id. ¶ 6 (“The essence of a trademark is
therefore the right of the trademark owner to apply [its trademark] to a product or
its packaging.”); id. ¶ 16 (“Plain packaging would be inconsistent with a Member
State’s obligations under TRIPS and the Paris Convention.”). Citing Bennett supra
and Memorandum from LALIVE supra, Gervais argued, “In summary, there may
be legitimate differences of opinion as to whether a plain packaging measure
accords with Article 6quinquies and Article 7 of the Paris Convention.” Daniel
Gervais, Analysis of the Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging
Rules with the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention, ¶ 68 (Nov. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules].
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explained, Paris and TRIPS confer a right to registration in certain
circumstances and a right of registration carries with it a right of
exclusion.115 As we have also explained, Paris also confers a right of
exclusion on owners of well-known trademarks in certain
circumstances.116
These arguments that a right to use necessarily exists as a
consequence of a right of exclusion face the fundamental theoretical
flaw that they do not differentiate between a right to exclude others
from using something and a privilege of using that same thing. At
this point, we should address the argument that a prohibition on use
deprives a trademark owner of the “enjoyment” of its right to
exclude third parties from using its trademark.117 The issue is
addressed relatively easily. The way to enjoy the right to stop other
traders from using a trademark is to stop them from using that
trademark.118
The way to enjoy a privilege of using a trademark is to use the
trademark. Other traders will not have a claim right to prevent the
enjoyment of that privilege although they may, in limited
circumstances, also share the privilege of using a trademark.
Whether a trademark owner can enjoy that privilege will depend
on whether governments have a power to restrict the privilege of use,
and have exercised that power. As explained above, the starting point
at international law is that governments do enjoy such a power, and
there is nothing in the Paris Convention that removes it. The attempt
to conflate the right to exclude with the privilege of use, and thereby
conjure into existence a right of use that is binding upon
governments, is a reflection of a failure to appreciate three relevant
factors: (1) the distinction between a right and a privilege; (2) the
circumstances in which either or both can be affected by the different
legitimate interests of different third parties in different relationships
115. See discussion supra Part III.A.
116. See generally TRIPS Agreement art. 16(2)–(3) (expanding the scope of the
right of exclusion conferred on owners of well-known trademarks).
117. See Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Tobacco Plain
Packaging, supra note 1 (arguing at the WTO that plain packaging adversely
affects the “enjoyment” of the right of exclusion); Request for Consultations by
Honduras, Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 1.
118. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pt. III (dedicating an entire section to
enforcement).
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with different trademark owners; and (3) the way in which an
international agreement might address these distinct facets of an
intellectual property regime. This attempt to conflate the right to
exclude with the privilege of use is based on a trademark owner’s
centric perspective that focuses only on how any restraints are
perceived by trademark owners.
The same argument applies in relation to the “enjoyment” of the
right to prevent use by others of well known, unregistered
trademarks.119 One cannot bootstrap a right to exclude others from
using a well known trademark into a right to use a well known
trademark sufficiently to maintain its well known status. Once again,
a privilege of using the well known trademark exists, but it is subject
to the same power of government to assert a claim right to prevent
the exercise of that privilege on the basis of the government’s
legitimate interests.120
With regard to the Paris Convention, legal representatives for
major tobacco companies put it bluntly to the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) many years ago that the Paris
Convention prevented plain packaging because of the “enjoyment”
of the right to registration argument.121 WIPO’s response was equally
blunt and directly denied the proposition.122 In addition, the idea of
inserting a right to use in Paris was discussed and dismissed in the
1950s.123 The attempt to combine an entitlement to enjoy the right of

119. See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 44, 60, 62A (Austl.) (preventing
anyone other than the true owner from registering a well known tobacco trademark
or a similar trademark).
120. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.E.4.
121. See Mark Davison, Plain Packaging and the TRIPS Agreement: A
Response to Professor Gervais, 23 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 160, 164 (2013)
(arguing that “[t]he spirit and letter of Paris is that the registration of trademarks is
regulated by Paris but the allowance or disallowance of use of registered
trademarks is a matter for sovereign nations”).
122. Letter from Ludwig Baeumer to Ralph Oman (Aug. 31, 1994), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/brs60d00/pdf (“[C]ountries party to the Paris
Convention remain free to regulate or prohibit the sale of certain types of goods,
and the fact that a mark has been registered for such goods does not give the right
to the holder of the registration to be exempted from any limitation or prohibition
of use of the mark decided by the competent authority of the country where the
mark is registered.”).
123. Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules,
supra note 114, ¶ 66.
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exclusion with the privilege of use to change or bolster the nature
and extent of the privilege of use is, therefore, something that we
reject. It has no foundation in the text of the relevant agreements and
is an expression of conceptual confusion.

B. ARTICLE 20 AND THE POWER TO PREVENT USE
There is no doubt that Article 20 restricts to some extent the power
of a government to limit the privilege of use. It requires that
encumbrances on use of a trademark by special requirements not be
unjustifiable.124 As was suggested above, this is, therefore, a situation
in which a government has surrendered, by way of international
agreement, some of its power to determine, by way of its own
internal processes, the scope of its legitimate interests, and hence the
rights that it may assert on the basis of them. Article 20 removes the
process of determining whether a government has a legitimate
interest in claiming a right to prevent use from the exclusively
internal processes of that government, and makes the justification of
the right asserted subject to scrutiny at the international level by the
WTO.125
It seems that all commentators on the point agree that the specific
requirements for the particular use of word trademarks imposed by
the plain packaging legislation are subject to Article 20 and therefore
must be justifiable.126 If Article 20 goes further and restricts the

124. See TRIPS Agreement art. 20 (listing requirements that could constitute
unjustifiable encumbrances, such as “use with another trademark, use in a special
form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the good or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings”).
125. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
126. See Mark Davison, The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging Under
International Intellectual Property Law: Why There Is No Right to Use a
Trademark Under Either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement, in PUBLIC
HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 81, 106 (Tania
Voon, Andrew Mitchell & Jonathan Liberman eds., 2012) [hereinafter Davison,
The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging] (noting that the concept of “an encumbrance
by special requirements” must be narrower than the concept of “an encumbrance,”
and hence that the straightforward prohibition of non-word trademarks “limits the
inquiry as to what encumbrances needs to be justified under Article 20” to those
specifying the manner of use of word trademarks); Gervais, Compatibility of
Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules, supra note 114, ¶¶ 32, 34 (arguing
how the Article 20 requirements are key in deciding whether plain packaging
measures are in compliance with TRIPS).
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power of government to prevent the use of non-word trademarks on
the basis that a prohibition on use is also an encumbrance by special
requirements,127 the question remains as to what constitutes a
justifiable encumbrance or, more literally, what unjustifiably
encumbers by special requirements the use of trademarks in the
course of trade. In turn, the issue of justifiability determines the
scope of TRIPS’s protection of the privilege of use. Our contention is
that an encumbrance of this sort is justified when it is supported by
the internationally recognizable legitimate interests of a government
sufficient to defeat what would otherwise be the privilege of use, and
is thereby sufficient to ground a claim right on the part of the
government that a trademark not be used. The legitimate interests
that support such a claim right in the context of plain packaging are
discussed below.128

C. A POSITIVE ENTITLEMENT TO USE ARGUMENT
A variation on the distinction between a right and a privilege is
advanced by Frankel and Gervais as a basis for rejecting an
interpretation along the lines we have advanced. Frankel and Gervais
claim, instead, that Article 20 provides a strong, positive entitlement
to use trademarks.129 We use the general term “entitlement” because
the precise nature of the entitlement is difficult to discern. Frankel
127. See Davison, The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging, supra note 126, at 94
(arguing that encumbrances by special requirements are positive requirements
relating to use and not to partial or total bans).
128. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
129. Frankel and Gervais no longer assert a right to use, but something that is
nearly a right, but more than a privilege. See generally Frankel & Gervais, supra
note 52. However, previous publications had asserted that there is a right to use a
trademark under Article 20. See, e.g., Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco
Product Packaging Rules, supra note 114, ¶ 33 (“The first sentence of Article 20
seems to imply a ‘right to use’ a trademark because otherwise there would be no
need to cabin the power of WTO Members to ‘encumber’ such use.”); Bennett,
supra note 114 (asserting that there is a right to use a trademark under Article 20);
Memorandum from LALIVE, supra note 114 (same). Gervais argued in, DANIEL
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS ¶ 2.278
(4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter GERVAIS, TRIPS DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS,
4th Edition], however, that “TRIPS art. 20 seems to contain a right not to be
encumbered and a justification defence.” Id. If an encumbrance includes a
prohibition on use, the “right” in this context then becomes a right not to be
prohibited from using a trademark, which is a right of use expressed by way of a
double negative.
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and Gervais describe the entitlement as something more than a
privilege but less than a right.130
The simple proposition that Article 20 confers no claim right to
use a trademark is replaced by a beguilingly complex proposition.
This proposition starts with the statement that Article 20 protects a
privilege that can be called a legitimate interest to use a trademark. 131
How it can be called that is not entirely clear.132 Frankel and Gervais
equate a “legitimate interest” with a privilege because the former is
the term used in TRIPS.133 They then state that a “legitimate interest”
is something more than a privilege but possibly less than a right.134
The entitlement of a trademark owner to positive use of its
trademark is placed on a spectrum of rights and privileges. At the
one end of this spectrum is an absolute right to use a trademark, and
at the other end is a privilege of use, which may be subject to severe
government restrictions.135 Frankel and Gervais consider the
entitlement of a trademark owner to lies toward the “right” end of the
spectrum, creating a strong, positive entitlement to use a trademark

130. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1190 n.180 (arguing for a “continuum
perspective” according to which “Hofheldian privileges in which the property
owner might claim legitimate interests are somewhere between the two extreme
(all or nothing) approaches,” and arguing further that “legitimate interests are more
positive than privileges”).
131. See id. at 1194 (arguing that Article 20 protects a trademark from certain
encumbrances, and therefore, registration of a trademark may reflect a legitimate
interest to use the trademark).
132. See discussion supra Part III.B (explaining why there is no reason to
equate the concepts of privilege and legitimate interest).
133. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1190 (acknowledging that
“legitimate interest” is used in the TRIPS Agreement and arguing that it is a broad
term such that all rights are legitimate interests, but not all legitimate interests are
rights).
134. See id. at 1190 n.180 (“In this continuum, privileges and legitimate
interests are somewhere in between the two extremes of all or nothing approaches
that are outlined above. While exclusion purists might disagree, in the authors’
view legitimate interests are more positive than privileges. By stating that
trademark owners have legitimate interests, the TRIPS Agreement thus says more
than that third parties cannot interfere with use by the owner. A legitimate interest
can coexist with a right—that is, a right is a legitimate interest, but not all
legitimate interests are rights.”).
135. See also id. at 1212 (stating that an absolute use is unrealistic and an
absolute ban would render the right to exclude—i.e., the negative right—
irrelevant).
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but not an absolute right to use.136 Consequently, their approach is
described as a “middle ground.”137
This “middle-ground” positive entitlement to use would be
defeasible only if a government can justify the encumbrance on
use.138 In the end, the argument is that the legitimate interest to use a
trademark imposes a very significant duty on governments not to
interfere with use.139 It includes a duty not to prevent use for public
health reasons unless the prevention of use is necessary for public
health within the meaning of Article 8(1).140 This view of the role of
Article 8(1) is based, in part, on the proposition that intellectual
property law and trademark laws especially do not have a widely
recognized concept of “justifiability,” at least in this context.141 Some
national laws prohibit unjustifiable threats of trademark
infringement, but for the purposes of Article 20, that is not the
relevant justification. TRIPS provides an express justification if
measures are necessary for public health within the meaning of
Article 8(1) and are consistent with the other provisions of TRIPS. 142
Consequently, if public health concerns are the only justification
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1198 (discussing the “middle ground” pertaining to the
legitimate interests of trademark owners who are said to possess positive legitimate
interests).
138. See id. at 1206 (asserting that an encumbrance may be justified if it is in
the public interest and supported by evidence).
139. See id. at 1197 (arguing that the limitations on trademark owners’ rights do
not show that there is never a right or legitimate interest to use a trademark).
140. See id. at 1204 (“It must be borne in mind that both [Articles 8(1) and
8(2)] require that the measure be necessary.”); id. at 1213 (“Article 8 and other
WTO documents recognize public health as a valid field to take appropriate policy
measures (subject to other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement), and tobacco is
assuredly a serious public health issue. However, the TRIPS Agreement’s
interpretation in this context will impact other areas of trademarks, commerce and
probably other intellectual property rights.”); see also GERVAIS, TRIPS DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 4th Edition, supra note 129, § 2.277 (directly comparing
Article 20 of TRIPS and Article XX of the GATT, which refers to measures
“necessary to protect . . . human health”); id. § 2.278 (stating that “[f]acially,
TRIPS art. 20 is closer to GATT art. XX(d) than to art. 2.2 TBT” and there is
therefore no obligation on the complainant to prove the existence of less restrictive
alternative measures). Both paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article XX of GATT refer to
necessity, but as we have noted, TRIPS Article 20 does not.
141. See generally Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product
Packaging Rules, supra note 114, ¶¶ 73–87.
142. TRIPS Agreement art. 8(1).
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advanced for the plain packaging legislation, the onus is said to be on
the Australian government to prove that the measures are, in fact,
necessary for public health within the meaning of that expression in
Article 8(1).143 At this point, it is hard to conclude that anything other
than a right to use is being discussed. After all, how can there be a
duty on a government not to prevent use but for public health
reasons, unless there is a correlative right to use a trademark? Since
it has been proposed, however, the spectrum argument needs to be
addressed.
We utterly reject the spectrum approach to rights and privileges.
There is a critical distinction to be made between these two modes of
entitlement. The spectrum approach is simultaneously too
complicated and too simple. It is too complicated because of the
convoluted and not entirely transparent process by which it
concludes that there is a spectrum and where trademark owner’s
entitlements land on that spectrum. It is too simple because it ignores
143. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, 1205–06. The precise role of Article
8(1) in Frankel and Gervais’ approach is not entirely clear, but it seems that they
are proposing that a test of necessity for public health applies to justifiability under
Article 20. For example, see the reference to “necessity” supra note 140. They
quote the EC – Asbestos report where the panel was considering the issue of
whether the measures were necessary for human health within the meaning of the
GATT. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1209. In addition, specific reference
is made to the need of a complainant to demonstrate both that the measures are
more restrictive than necessary and that there are “adequate alternative measures”
under Article 2.2 of the TBT, id. at 1207–08, together with the clear statement that,
unlike the position with the TBT, the burden of proof is on the respondent in the
TRIPS context. Id. Further, they state that, “A major difference between the TRIPS
Agreement and other WTO instruments that a panel would likely consider is that
the TRIPS Agreement (unlike GATT or GATS) contains obligations concerning
specific rights of individual right holders and specific boundaries on limitations
and exceptions to such rights.” Id. at 1208. They go on to argue that “those
boundaries are defined throughout the agreement where exceptions and limitations
must meet specific tests (arts. 13, 17, 30), specific criteria (arts. 27.2, 27.3 and
31), or both” which are provisions relating to exceptions to rights. Id. 1208 n.284.
The implicit statement that Article 20 confers rights on trademark owners
combined with a limitation on those rights is precisely the point about Article 20
that we reject and which the spectrum argument attempts to finesse by describing
Article 20 as conferring a legitimate interest to use a trademark which is close to
and almost a right. Article 20 does not confer a right on trademark owners. On the
contrary, and as will be discussed further below, it acknowledges that government
may assert a claim right to restrict the privilege of use in certain circumstances and
pays limited regard to just one of the legitimate interests of trademark owners, as a
factor relevant to identifying those circumstances.
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the relational aspect of particular rights and particular privileges.
Thus, if one focuses on a relational approach to rights, the focus must
be on (1) who has a legitimate interest; (2) the nature of that
legitimate interest; and (3) whether another party should be required
to respect that legitimate interest. Then, consideration needs to be
given to who has a duty as a consequence of that interest and what is
the nature of that duty in light of the respective interests of those
parties.144
Similarly, if a privilege is being considered, the focus must be on
the legitimate interests of the relevant parties in the context of the
particular relationship being addressed, and whether a particular
party should have a “no-right” that the privileged party refrain from
the permitted conduct. Furthermore, if one party enjoys a privilege in
relation to another party, the privilege may nevertheless be defeasible
by a third party to the extent that the third party has a claim right to
prevent the exercise of that privilege. However, establishing that
such a scenario exists requires identification of the particular third
party and the legitimate interest upon which that party’s claim right
is based. The particular third party may have a legitimate interest that
justifies a claim right to limit the exercise of the privilege, or even to
deprive a party of that privilege altogether, but it might be only that
particular third party that has the relevant claim right. If this is so,
then only that third party will be able to exercise its claim right
against the privilege of use, and the manner in which it may limit or
deny the exercise of the privilege will depend upon the nature of its
particular claim right.145
For example, other traders clearly have a “no-right” in relation to
the privilege of use. They have no legitimate interest in preventing
such use, and no basis for a claim right to do so. On occasions, they
may have a legitimate interest in using a trademark themselves but
without preventing use by trademark owners.146 Hence, Article 17
permits limited exceptions to the right of exclusion that have regard
to the legitimate interests of third parties, but Article 17 does not
144. See generally RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 171–
72, 184–86 (discussing the ways in which particular balances of interests across
and between parties can result in one party owing a duty to another, and discussing
also the nature and limits of the duties that arise).
145. See discussion supra Part III.A–III.B.
146. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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permit those third parties to interfere with the privilege of use.147
However, if the third party is the government acting in its role as a
regulator of the use of trademarks, the position alters significantly
because the relationship in question is very different from the
relationship between trademark owners and other traders.148 It is the
legitimate interests of trademark owners and governments that need
to be considered, as that is the relevant relationship, and the
legitimate interests of government may very well underpin a claim
right to interfere with the privilege of use that is not shared by
traders.
We agree that TRIPS not only confers rights of exclusion, but also
acknowledges that trademark owners may have legitimate interests,
including legitimate interests in use. What TRIPS does not say,
however, is that these legitimate interests confer upon trademark
owners a claim right against the government, or something
approaching a claim right that is more than a privilege, that obliges
the government to permit the trademark to be used. To the contrary,
TRIPS permits and specifically contemplates, in Article 20,
justifiable limitations upon the privilege of use arising from the
countervailing interests of governments.149 At the same time, Article
20 removes some of the power of a government to determine such
questions solely via its internal processes.150
To speak of entitlements in general terms as existing on a fixed
point in a spectrum between an absolute right and a defeasible
privilege lumps into one basket all the relationships concerning a
trademark and identifies one point on the spectrum where the
entitlement stays. It then considers all exceptions from this one
reference point. But TRIPS does not confer upon trademark owners a
claim to be at a particular point on any spectrum of entitlement to use
their trademarks in the course of trade. It establishes a complex
system of rights and obligations, and it is against that system, not
individual trademark owners’ hopes for the outcome of that system,
that the international legality of plain packaging must be assessed.
147. TRIPS Agreement art. 17.
148. But cf. Turning Over a New Leaf, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2013 (describing
how the Japanese government is the majority shareholder of Japan Tobacco
International Ltd., and therefore acts as a trader).
149. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
150. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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This is not simply a matter of “purism” about the theoretical
understanding of the concepts in play: it is about getting the law
right.151 Article 20 does not create a right of use or some hybrid of a
right and a privilege that confers an entitlement to use; it focuses on
the privilege of use and the power of government to restrict that use
on the basis of its legitimate interests.152 Under Article 20, that power
may be exercised, provided that its exercise is justifiable,153 that is,
provided that the government has legitimate interests sufficient to
ground a claim right that use of the trademarks in question be
restricted. As discussed in detail above, not all legitimate interests
will ground a claim right and its correlative duty; it is important that
the balance of reasons favor the imposition of a duty on others.154 We
discuss this issue below (“Do the interests of government justify a
claim right to support the duties imposed on tobacco companies by
plain packaging legislation?”).155

151. Frankel and Gervais distinguish their position from that which “purists”
might adopt, asserting that, in their view,
[L]egitimate interests are more positive than privileges. By stating that trademark
owners have legitimate interests, the TRIPS Agreement thus says more than that third
parties cannot interfere with use by the owner. A legitimate interest can co-exist with a
right—that is, a right is a legitimate interest but not all legitimate interests are rights.

Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1190 n.180. This portrayal of legitimate
interests of trademark owners as being somehow greater than the privilege that
they underpin is a considerable overreach in interpretation. It attempts to pre-judge
the issue under Article 20 as to whether trademark owners’ interests are more
important than the interests of government. The approach is not supported by the
actual words of TRIPS or specifically Article 20, which in any event clearly does
not refer to all legitimate interests of trademark owners. The approach does not
accord with the way in which international law understands the powers of
government and the constraint of such powers by international agreements. Nor is
the approach supported by any commonly accepted theory of the nature of rights,
interests and privileges that would inform understanding of context, object or
purpose. In short, they have created a new analysis of rights, duties, interests and
privileges that lacks foundation, and they defend this creation that favors tobacco
trademark owners by asking that interpreters not act like “purists,” thus implicitly
suggesting that doing so would be an exercise in pedantry rather than accuracy.
152. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
153. Id.
154. See discussion supra Part III.B.
155. See discussion infra Part IV.I.
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D. A NOD TO FORMALISM AND A REMEMBRANCE OF OBJECT AND
PURPOSE
To this point, we have based this discussion heavily on theory and
general principle to avoid suggestions of formalism in the approach
to TRIPS. We have explained, in those terms, the theoretical reason
why the distinction between a right and a privilege must be
maintained in order to understand TRIPS, and we will address it
further below.
At this point, however, some formalism may also be in order.
Apart from the critical theoretical distinction between rights and
privileges, the spectrum approach cannot be finessed by decrying
formalistic, binary approaches to interpretation or an appeal to
property principles.156 When it comes to conferring or not conferring
“rights,” the WTO is as binary as it gets and for good reason: WTO
Members do not readily embrace the idea that they have agreed to
confer rights that are not expressed as such. The TRIPS Agreement is
very clear about when it confers rights, as it says so expressly and
uses the term “right” or “rights” on 131 separate occasions, not
counting the full title of the agreement itself or any of the footnotes
to the agreement.157 None of those 131 occasions includes Article 20.
No good faith interpretation of Article 20 can turn it into a right to
use. No good faith interpretation based on theory or formal wording
creates a hybrid of a right and a privilege that dwells within Article
20.
156. Frankel and Gervais appear to acknowledge, in a discussion of property
law and property rights, that the best account of property rights is what they call
the “gatekeeper” model, on which a bundle of rights to exclude others creates an
exclusive privilege of use of the property. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at
1189–92. This seems indistinguishable from the Hohfeldian picture that we have
outlined above. On its own, it tells us nothing about the scope of the privilege of
use, nor what limitations upon it might be justifiable. Frankel and Gervais
themselves acknowledge that “the law does not give unrestricted control [over
property] to any property owner.” Id. at 1192. They are correct to state that, “The
label negative rights” does not determine “the ‘contours of the owner’s position.’”
Id. at 1192 (citing Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 285 (2008)). But this does no more than tell us that we cannot
know the contours of the owner’s position until we understand the contours of the
legitimate interests of both the owner and relevant third parties. In the context of
regulatory limitations and TRIPS, this means considering what legitimate interests
of governments might justify encumbrances pursuant to Article 20.
157. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement arts. 3, 4, 6, 7.
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Furthermore, any such interpretation would itself be contrary to
the Vienna Convention principles of treaty interpretation. As noted
earlier, Article 31 makes ordinary meaning, in light of context, object
and purpose, the touchstone of treaty interpretation.158 It is no doubt
proper, even mandatory, to use the broader treaty context, and the
object and purpose that this evinces, to ascertain the meaning of
particular terms. But it is something else altogether to infer first from
the terms of the treaty a paramount purpose to facilitate the use of
trademarks in the course of trade that underpins far more than a
privilege, and then to use that inferred purpose as a heuristic to
impute meaning to an article of the treaty—namely, confining
“justifiability” for the purposes of Article 20 to the express terms of
Article 8.159 While this may be a permissible mode of interpretation
in some domestic systems of law,160 it is not what the Vienna
Convention contemplates. Neither the paramount purpose that they
claim nor their approach to the relationship between Article 20 and
Article 8 is supported by the words of the treaty.
Finally, at key points, the positive entitlement argument based on a
spectrum between rights and privileges moves from decrying
formalism to embracing it. For example, the spectrum argument is
avowedly non-formalistic up to the point at which a positive
entitlement to use is generated by the means already described and
the concept of “justifiability” is confined to Article 8(1). At that
point, the legitimate interests of government are cabined within the

158. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31.
159. TRIPS Agreement arts. 8, 20.
160. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN
AN UNJUST WORLD 195–98 (2011) (discussing this mode of reasoning in U.S.
constitutional theorizing); cf. Lange v Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR
520, 561, 567 (Austl.) (the High Curt of Australia unanimously rejected the
permissibility of this mode of reasoning in interpreting the Australian Constitution,
stating that “the freedom of communication which the Constitution protects . . . is
limited to what is necessary for the effective operation of that system of
representative and responsible government provided for by the Constitution . . . .
To the extent that the requirement of freedom of communication is an implication
drawn from ss 7, 24, 64, 128 and related sections of the Constitution, the
implication can validly extend only so far as is necessary to give effect to these
sections. Although some statements in the earlier cases might be thought to suggest
otherwise, when they are properly understood, they should be seen as purporting to
give effect only to what is inherent in the text and structure of the Constitution”).

2014]

ARTICLE 20 OF TRIPS AND PLAIN PACKAGING

549

strict, formalistic wording of Article 8(1).161 Simultaneously, the
formal, linguistic distinction between “necessity” in Article 8(1) and
“justifiability” in Article 20, and the fact that Article 8 is presented
under the heading “Principles” and within the heading to Part I of
“General Provisions and Basic Principles” rather than (for instance)
“Justifiable limitations or encumbrances,” is given little credence.
Formalism seems to be championed at some points and criticized at
others.

E. THE TRADEMARK PROVISIONS IN TRIPS AND THE SCOPE OF
GOVERNMENT POWER UNDER ARTICLE 20
Support for the proposition that Article 20 confers a privilege that
is relatively defeasible comes from a consideration of several items:
(1) the other provisions in the trademarks section of TRIPS; (2)
Article 20 itself; and (3) international norms and practice. Below, we
will undertake a consideration of other TRIPS trademark provisions
in the context of Article 20. Articles 15 to 21 of TRIPS have a
number of complex aspects to their interpretation that need to be
addressed. It is important to avoid interpreting them and Article 20
by reference to a right-to-use or entitlement-to-use heuristic that does
not address that complexity.
1. Article 15
Article 15 defines a trademark as any sign that is capable of
distinguishing goods from other goods.162 It also contemplates the
registration of trademarks, and therefore, a system of trademark
registration.163 Some of the details of the system of registration are
incorporated via the Paris Convention.164 For example, registration
cannot be denied on the basis of the nature of the goods to which a
trademark is to be applied.165
Article 15 does a number of other things that are pertinent to the
161. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1204 (emphasizing that both
paragraphs of Article 8(1) require that the measure be necessary); see also
GERVAIS, TRIPS DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 4th Edition, supra note 129,
§ 2.278.
162. TRIPS Agreement art. 15(1).
163. Id. art. 15.
164. Id. art. 2(1); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
165. TRIPS Agreement art. 15(4).
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right/privilege discussion concerning Article 20. First, it provides
that many trademarks are inherently capable of distinguishing goods
without them being used. Article 15 states, in part, that “[w]here
signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods
or services, Members may make registrability depend on
distinctiveness acquired through use.”166 Prior to TRIPS, many, if not
most, nations only permitted registration of trademarks that were
inherently distinctive.167 In other words, they had a capacity to
distinguish even before use.168 This category of trademarks remains
extremely important. Apart from the fact that most trademarks fall
into this category, their registration is cheaper because the costs of
proving use that demonstrates distinctiveness to a trademark office
may be so onerous as to outweigh the benefit of registration.
Article 15(3) states that use is not a condition for filing an
application for registration even though a Member may make
registrability depend on use.169 Stated another way, Members do not
have to make registration dependent on use. Registration leads to the
right to exclusion under Article 16(1), but it is separate from the
privilege of use.
While Article 15 indicates that a system of registration of
trademarks exists and that the intention may be to use them, it says
nothing about the constraints imposed by government on the
privilege of use. As already pointed out, under the Paris Convention
system, the privilege of use was completely defeasible.170 Article 15
may support the proposition that the intention is that trademarks may
be used, but against whom is the privilege of use held or, more
precisely, who will have the “no-right” in relation to the privilege?
The background to the Paris Convention and Article 15 demonstrate
that the relationship in question is that of registered trademark
owners and other traders.171
Finally, Article 15 clearly indicates that there are separate
166. Id. art. 15(1).
167. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (superseded) ss 25–26 (Austl.).
168. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR
417, 424 (Austl.) (“Inherent adaptability is something which depends on the nature
of the trade mark itself.”).
169. TRIPS Agreement art. 15(3).
170. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
171. See id.
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categories: signs and trademarks.172 The latter are a subset of the
former. The plain packaging legislation is very much aimed at the
use of non-word signs in retail tobacco packaging and the interests of
government in regulating their use needs to be considered. Article 15
also clearly differentiates between trademarks and registered
trademarks.173 Other provisions in TRIPS also address this
proposition.174 The relevance of this point is discussed in relation to
the rights of exclusion conferred by Article 16.
2. Articles 15 and 20
Article 20 speaks of “use in a manner detrimental to [the
trademark’s] capability to distinguish.”175 Article 15 clearly provides
that an inherently distinctive trademark retains its capability to
distinguish the goods or services it represents even without use,
provided that the right of exclusion is maintained by the owner of
such a trademark.176 The negotiating history of Article 20 confirms
that it was intended to be consistent with Article 15.177 At the very
least, both Article 15 and Article 20 indicate that there are degrees of
detriment to capacity to distinguish.178 The degree of detriment will
depend on the nature of any encumbrance on use. Whether trademark
owners remain entitled to use some trademarks to distinguish their
goods may influence the existence of a claim right of a government
to prohibit use of trademarks in some circumstances and also the
issue of whether the legitimate interests that underpin such a right
outweighs the interest in use that underpins a privilege of use.
Article 15 distinguishes between registered and unregistered
trademarks. Article 20 deals with all trademarks. It is not restricted to
registered trademarks. Article 15 only supports the conferral of rights
on owners of registered trademarks. It does not support the conferral
of rights or even privileges on owners of unregistered trademarks.179

172. TRIPS Agreement art. 15(1).
173. Id.
174. Id. arts. 16, 20, 21.
175. Id. art. 20.
176. Id. art. 15.
177. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF TRADEMARKS AND
DESIGNS 326–27 (2d ed. 2011).
178. TRIPS Agreement arts. 15, 20.
179. Id. art. 15.
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3. Article 16
As already indicated, Article 16(1), (2), and (3) confers a right of
exclusion.180 Notably, the right of exclusion pertains to registered
trademarks and well known trademarks.181 No general right of
exclusion exists in respect of all trademarks, whether registered or
not and whether well known or not.
The right conferred by Article 16(1) is a right to exclude others
from using the registered trademark in the course of trade.182 No right
to exclude use exists outside the course of trade. It also says nothing
about the extent to which the privilege of use is defeasible because of
some power of government to assert, on the basis of its legitimate
interests, a claim right restricting use. As discussed above, we reject
the “enjoyment of the right of exclusion argument” as a means of
limiting the power of government to restrict use.183 Importantly, the
right to exclude use needs to be considered in more detail. The
exclusive privilege of use retained by a trademark owner, by virtue
of Article 16’s withdrawal of the privilege of use from other traders,
exists to prevent confusion in the course of trade. Privileges are
sometimes abused. When they are abused in ways that affect the
legitimate interests of governments, governments may permissibly
confer upon themselves a claim right that restricts the privilege.
4. Articles 16 and 20
Article 20 refers to all trademarks.184 Civil law countries do not
protect unregistered trademarks per se, and nobody argues that they
do or should.185 The international trademark system and its norms are
180. See discussion supra Part III.A.
181. TRIPS Agreement art. 16.
182. See id. art. 16(1) (“The owner of a registered trademark shall have the
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from
using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which
are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered
where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.”).
183. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
184. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
185. See, e.g., Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging
Rules, supra note 114, ¶ 45 (“In countries with a civil law system, registration of a
mark is the legal act that confers rights. Unregistered marks are not protected as
such.”); accord Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1190 (“In countries with a
civil law system, registration of a mark is the legal act that confers rights.
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clearly designed to accommodate that view. If there is no right of
exclusion in respect of an unregistered trademark in civil law
countries, how else can Article 20 be interpreted other than
indicating that there is a privilege, not a right, of use of any
trademark, and a privilege liable to significant defeasibility? At this
point, it becomes even harder to understand how the spectrum
interpretation of Article 20 can be described as attempting to confer
anything other than a right that is asserted without adequate regard to
the text of TRIPS. What is the legitimate interest in using an
unregistered, not well-known trademark in a context where civil law
countries at least do not currently recognize exclusive privileges to
use such trademarks? And if there is such an interest, how is it
feasible or not too onerous to expect any country, especially civil law
countries, to have a duty to permit use of unregistered trademarks in
light of the longstanding, TRIPS-acknowledged and unchallenged
practice in those countries? There may be a sufficient interest in
using unregistered trademarks to justify a privilege of use, but it is
inherently defeasible and subject to a claim right by governments to
prevent that use. Furthermore, at least until registration is sought and
obtained, a government does not know which signs are trademarks
and which ones are not. If it has a claim right to prevent the use of
signs, it is less feasible and certainly more onerous to require it to
attempt to discriminate between mere signs and signs that are
trademarks.
Even in common law countries, the relevant property interest in an
unregistered trademark is the goodwill of the trademark owner that is
generated by the use of the trademark.186 That is, even common law
Unregistered marks are not protected as such”).
186. See AG Spalding & Bros. v. AW Gamage, Ltd., [1915] All E.R. 147
(H.L.) (Eng.) (confirming that there is no property in an unregistered trademark but
only in the goodwill generated by the use of that trademark); see also Trade Marks
Act 1995 (Cth) s 120 (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if the
person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or
deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered.”); id. pt 13 (referencing an entire section with a
comprehensive system for seizure of goods that infringe a registered trademark);
id. s 72 (identifying the rights stemming from registration as taking effect on the
date of lodging an application); id. s 68 (generally discussing the obligation to
register). Registration of a trademark is more than confirmatory of some common
law title. It confers ownership in respect of the trademark itself rather than the
goodwill associated with the trademark. The right to sue for infringement
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countries only protect the goodwill associated with a trademark
rather than the trademark per se. The trademark itself is not the
subject of rights. Article 21 confirms this proposition by providing
that the assignment of unregistered trademarks may be subject to the
requirement that the assignment include an assignment of the
relevant business.187 Article 21 specifically states that the assignment
of registered trademarks is not subject to such a requirement,
demonstrating the considerable difference between an unregistered
trademark and a registered trademark, even in common law
countries.188 As with civil law systems, the common law system
clearly suggests that Article 20 does not confer a right of use or some
spectral variant of a right.
It cannot be a linguistic accident that Article 20 refers to all
trademarks rather than registered trademarks, or registered
trademarks and well known trademarks. Several provisions in TRIPS
make the clear distinction between these categories.189 It is not a
formalistic argument to say that civil law countries do not protect
unregistered trademarks as trademarks. Nor is it formalistic to say
that in common law countries, the protection of unregistered
trademarks occurs through the protection of goodwill. Article 21
refers specifically to the distinction between the property in a
registered trademark and goodwill developed through use.190
(unauthorized use by another) exists even in the absence of use of the registered
trademark or evidence of any reputation or goodwill associated with the registered
trademark. See Wingate Marketing Pty. Ltd. v Levi Strauss & Co. (1994) 121
A.L.R. 191, 15 (Austl.). As Gummow J stated in Wingate,
The modern British legislation is generally considered to commence with the Trade
Marks Registration Acts 1875–77 (U.K.). There was some uncertainty before it was
established by judicial decision that this legislation permitted registration of marks
which had not previously become distinctive by use and that, in other words, a
registered proprietor who could not maintain a passing-off action, because of a lack of
necessary reputation nevertheless could, on registration, sue for infringement. Thus,
from the outset, the legislative scheme differed in a fundamental respect from the
common law; see the discussion of the authorities by Dixon J in The Shell Company of
Australia Limited v Rohm and Haas Company (1949) 78 CLR 601 at 625–628.

Wingate Marketing Pty. Ltd. v Levi Strauss & Co. (1994) 121 A.L.R. 191, 77
(Austl.) (emphasis added).
187. TRIPS Agreement art. 21.
188. Id.
189. Id. arts. 15, 16, 18, 19, 21.
190. Contra Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1177 (“Where registration for
intended use is possible, it only creates inchoate rights (which may in some
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Similar considerations require rejection of a revised version of the
“bootstrapping” argument mentioned earlier in relation to well
known trademarks.191 The argument is that Article 20 confers special
protection upon well-known trademarks, because in addition to
protecting the capability of such a trademark to distinguish, Article
20 confers upon the owner of the well-known trademark an
entitlement to use it sufficiently to maintain its well known status.
This argument relies upon Article 16 not only as the source of a right
to exclude others from using well known trademarks but as a source,
in combination with Article 20, of a right on the part of the owner to
use such trademarks extensively, even though no such entitlement is
stated in the text of either article. TRIPS clearly refers to special
categories of trademarks, including well known trademarks, in those
other provisions when it confers special protections upon them. To
regard Article 20 as an exception that confers a distinctive
entitlement to use a certain category of trademarks, without express
words to that effect, would be at odds with this consistent feature of
the text.
Therefore, an alternative interpretation of Article 20, consistent
with these general textual features of TRIPS, is to be preferred. Such
an interpretation is available: Article 16(3) confers upon the owner of
a well-known trademark a right to exclude others from use of that
trademark. While the trademark continues to exist, Article 20
protects the mark from unjustifiable encumbrances that would be
detrimental to its capacity to distinguish. But there is no guarantee of
an entitlement to use the trademark sufficiently to retain its wellknown status. The purpose of TRIPS is “to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade,” but it is not the purpose of
TRIPS to protect the economic value of particular trademark owners’
property rights. Noting these points shows the “more than a
privilege” spectral interpretation of Article 20 to be untenable.
In at least one instance, Article 20 does support the right of
exclusion and prevent governments from assisting third-party traders

circumstances nonetheless be enforceable) because in common law systems, rights
in a trademark typically arise from use.”). At least in the context of the Australian
trademark system, this statement is simply incorrect. See discussion supra note
186.
191. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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to use the trademark of another.192 Article 20 provides that one of the
prima facie impermissible encumbrances on use is requiring use of a
(senior) trademark with another (junior) trademark.193 Such a
scenario is one where the junior trademark is engaging in a de facto
use of the senior trademark. The juxtaposition of the two is designed
to associate the junior trademark with the senior trademark. In that
sense, the owner of the junior trademark is using the senior
trademark, although the situation also diminishes the capability of
the senior trademark to distinguish. Article 20 restricts governments
that favor the owners of junior trademarks in this way, especially if
the junior trademark owner is a local trademark owner using a
foreign senior trademark.194
This approach is entirely appropriate. Given TRIPS’ insistence on
preventing distortions in international trade, the legitimate interests
of government in regulating trademark use do not extend to
conferring a de facto right of use on junior, local trademark owners.
Considerable evidence from the negotiating history of Article 20
shows that prevention of this form of trade distortion was its primary
objective.195
5. Article 17
As already noted, Article 17 refers to the legitimate interests of
trademark owners and the legitimate interests of third parties.196 It
refers primarily to other traders that might be using a trademark in
the course of trade.197 It provides the strongest recognition of any of
the exceptions in TRIPS for the legitimate interests of third parties.
192. TRIPS Agreement art. 20 (stating in part, “The use of a trademark in the
course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such
as use with another trademark”).
193. Id.
194. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 177, at 335; see also TRIPS Agreement art.
20. It should also be noted that the last sentence of Article 20 provides a very
specific example of when governments can require two trademarks to be used in
respect of particular goods and services. This issue, which was one relating to
mandating the circumstances of actual use of trademarks as opposed to some
prohibition on their use, was the focus of the negotiations on the wording of
Article 20.
195. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 133, at 325–27.
196. TRIPS Agreement art. 17; see discussion supra Part III.C.
197. European Communities – Trademarks and Geographical Indications,
supra note 57, ¶ 59.
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Article 17 envisages circumstances in which third parties as well as
trademark owners may have a privilege of using a trademark. In
those circumstances, neither the trademark owner nor the third party
has a claim right to prevent the other exercising the privilege of use.
6. Article 17 and Article 20
The relationship that Article 17 addresses is primarily the
relationship between a trademark owner and other traders, while
Article 20 primarily addresses the relationship between government
and trademark owners. The two relationships are usually
fundamentally different and certainly fundamentally different in the
context of plain packaging.
In some limited circumstances, the relationships may be similar.
As pointed out in the discussion about Article 16 and Article 20,
Article 20 also rightly has something to say in some circumstances
where governments use regulation to favor other traders and their use
of trademarks at the expense of trademark owners.198 Plain packaging
does not favor any tobacco trader.
7. Article 18
Article 18 provides that registration is renewable indefinitely.199
Registered trademarks are the only form of registered intellectual
property that could last forever. In turn, that suggests that the
privilege of use needs to be potentially subject to a wide range of
government regulatory action based on legitimate interests that
cannot necessarily be defined with precision in advance.
8. Article 19
Article 19 limits the circumstances in which registration might be
lost because of non-use of a trademark.200 Removal from the register
carries with it the loss of the right to prevent others from using the
trademark, The loss of registration also results in the loss of an
exclusive privilege of use and, possibly, a loss of any privilege of use
if someone else then registers the trademark. In other words, other
traders could obtain the privilege of use as a consequence of removal
198. See discussion supra Part IV.E.4.
199. TRIPS Agreement art. 18.
200. Id. art. 19.
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from the register. Article 19 limits the capacity of government to
effectively confer the privilege of use on other traders. It deals with
relationships between current trademark owners and other traders. It
does not confer upon a trademark owner a right to use that can be
asserted against government. Nor does it support the existence of
such a right.
Article 19 cannot be used to assert the proposition that government
cannot impose permanent restrictions on the privilege of use of
trademarks.201 In fact, Article 19, together with other provisions,
suggests the exact opposite, namely that governments can impose
“permanent” obstacles to use. Article 19 starts with the words, “If
use is required to maintain a registration.”202 Those words necessarily
mean that Article 19 contemplates that use may not be required to
maintain registration, and that governments have discretion in the
matter. The plain packaging legislation takes precisely this course,
by providing that use is not necessary for maintaining registration.203
At some point, the words of a provision are so plain that an
alternative meaning cannot be justified simply by decrying excessive
formalism. However, if the very clear wording of Article 19 is not
enough in itself to address the issue, there are other non-formalistic
aspects that support the proposition that Article 19 refers to
potentially permanent government obstacles to use. First, as already
noted, Article 15 provides that lack of use is not an obstacle to
registration.204 Second, Article 19 refers to obstacles to use
generally.205 These may include both obstacles particular to the
registered owner and obstacles imposed by government.206 It then
201. Contra Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, at 1185, 1212 (“Under Article
19.1, a ban on use cannot be used to cancel a registration, signaling that the ban
may well be temporary because that is precisely why a trademark owner would
want to maintain the registration.”).
202. TRIPS Agreement art. 19.
203. TPP Act 2011 s 28(3).
204. Id. art. 15; see discussion supra Part IV.E.1.
205. TRIPS Agreement art. 19.
206. The Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.) was introduced to meet
obligations under TRIPS and address other changes to trademark law that were
considered desirable. The legislation was based upon a report to the then Minister
for Science and Technology. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE AUSTRALIAN
TRADE MARKS LEGISLATION: WORKING PARTY TO REVIEW THE TRADE MARKS
LEGISLATION (Australian Govt. Pub. Service 1992) [hereinafter RECOMMENDED
CHANGES TO THE AUSTRALIAN TRADE MARKS LEGISLATION]. The second reading
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refers specifically to obstacles imposed by government “such as
import restrictions on or other government requirements for goods or
services protected by the trademark.” There is no reason why such
import restrictions cannot or will not be permanent. They are
certainly permanent until government makes a decision to remove
them or reduce them. Precisely the same can be said about the plain
packaging legislation. It is in place unless or until it is repealed or
amended. Third, Article 19 clearly envisages government restrictions
on use lasting beyond three years.207 How is a period beyond three
years “temporary”? What is the definition of “temporary” used by
those who argue that Article 19 contemplates the permissibility of
only temporary bans on trademark use? The difficulties of defining
“temporary” or even requiring such a definition are exacerbated by
Article 18. What is a temporary period of non-use in the context of
potential perpetuity of registration?
Article 19 clearly contemplates permanent restrictions on use,
which is entirely consistent with the proposition that Article 20 gives
some limited protection to a privilege of use that is subject to a
power of government to prevent the exercise of that privilege in
circumstances in which the legitimate interests of government give
rise to a countervailing claim right. It also clearly indicates that
where registration has occurred, the government’s claim right to
speech for the Trade Marks Bill 1995 notes, “The bill implements Australia’s
obligations under the WTO Agreement, but its main thrust is to implement the
government’s response to the July 1992 report, ‘Recommended changes to the
Australian trade marks legislation’, as modified by the consultation process I have
already mentioned.” Michael Lee, House of Representatives, Hansard, Main
Committee, Trade Marks Bill 1995, MC1910 (Sept. 27, 1995). The Working Party,
in section 3.1 of its report dealing with removal of trade marks for non-use, noted
that its proposals “took into account the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.”
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE AUSTRALIAN TRADE MARKS LEGISLATION,
supra, at 87. The Working Party’s recommendations under the heading “Defence
against an application for removal” notes,
33A. A registration may be protected against a claim for non-use by: . . .
circumstances which constitute an obstacle to the use of the registered trade mark,
whether applicable to traders generally, or specific to the proprietor of the mark. For
example, regulatory delay for pharmaceuticals, regulatory prohibition of use (e.g.
tobacco products), import restrictions or circumstances of war.

Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
207. TRIPS Agreement art. 19 (“[R]egistration may be cancelled only after an
uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use, unless valid reasons based
on the existence of obstacles to such use are shown by the trademark owner.”).
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prevent use does not and cannot extend to a claim right to take away
registration for that non-use; that is, the claim right does not extend
to a right to permit other traders to use the trademark. The possibility
that the privilege will be restored is maintained, and in the meantime,
the right of exclusion is maintained208 and the trademark owner may
enforce that right which it has against other traders.209
9. Article 21
This article deals with a number of matters. Under it, compulsory
licensing of trademarks is prohibited.210 Compulsory licensing is
inconsistent with the rights of exclusion of use in Article 16, and
clearly, the WTO members were providing that no legitimate interest
of any third party exists that ever justifies a compulsory license. A
compulsory license would permit use of the trademark by another
trader, in circumstances that would unwarrantedly suggest an
association with the trademark owner. Use by a third party without
control by the trademark owner necessarily means that two parties in
the marketplace are using the same trademark in inconsistent
208. The cost of renewing a trademark in Australia is 300 AUD for a ten year
period of renewal (or 30 AUD per year which is roughly the cost of two packets of
cigarettes in Australia). See IP AUSTRALIA, TRADE MARK FEES,
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get-the-right-ip/trade-marks/manage-your-trademark/renewing-your-trade-mark/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
209. The right of the trademark owner to prevent use by other traders of its
trademarks or similar trademarks is separate from and independent of the
obligation imposed by government via the plain packaging legislation on all
traders to refrain from use of non-word signs, including non-word trademarks. The
right of the trademark owner involves a duty owed to them by other traders not to
use their trademarks because the trademark owners have a claim right against those
other traders that reflects the interests of the parties. See Trade Marks Act 1995
(Cth) s 120. The plain packaging legislation imposes a duty that is owed to the
government by everyone to respect the government’s claim right to prevent use of
non-word signs, including non-word trademarks. See Tobacco Plain Packaging
Act 2011 (Cth) s 20(1) (Austl.) (“No trade mark may appear anywhere on the retail
packaging of tobacco products, other than as permitted by subsection (3).”). The
government has different interests that justify the duty that supports its claim right.
The consequences of different breaches of the different rights also reflect the
different interests at work. Trademark owners want damages or an account of
profits and/or an injunction available pursuant to the Trade Marks Act 1995 s
12(6). The government imposes a fine or imprisonment to enforce the duty owed to
it. See TPP Act 2011 s 3. The conflation of the two claim rights is inconsistent with
the nature of rights and the relational aspect of property.
210. TRIPS Agreement art. 21.
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manners, thus diminishing the trademark’s capacity to distinguish. It
is compelling a trademark owner to permit use by a third party rather
than enforce its right to prevent such use, that is more likely to
“destroy” a trademark. In effect, Article 21 provides that compulsory
licensing is never one of the permissible exceptions by which another
trader is given the privilege of using a trademark. It also provides
that the power of trademark owners to alter their legal relationships
by licensing arrangements cannot be taken away from them in this
manner and the disability of potential licensees to insist on such an
alteration stays in place.211 Again, it speaks to the relationship
between trademark owners and other traders.
The compulsory licensing aspect of Article 21 says little about the
defeasibility of the privilege of use via a countervailing claim right
of government. The little that it does say is that mandated, positive
use is more inappropriate than a government prohibition on use. The
former involves a contravention of the right of exclusion. The latter
does not. The former will also have a greater impact on the capability
to distinguish than the latter.
As mentioned in the discussion of Article 16, Article 21 clearly
differentiates between the nature of a legal interest in an unregistered
trademark and the legal interest in a registered trademark by its
reference to the different rules concerning the assignment of
unregistered or registered trademarks. Different interests exist in
different types of trademarks with varying consequences for
government regulation of those trademarks.
10. Article 20
As already identified, Article 20 applies to all trademarks whether
registered, unregistered, well known or not.212 The article is not
symmetrical with other articles such as Articles 16, 17, 18, and 19.
Neither civil nor common law countries provide protection for
unregistered trademarks.213 The protection common law countries
provide is to the goodwill generated by the use of trademarks, not the
trademarks themselves.
If Article 20 is to be interpreted as a right to use a trademark, it
211. Id.
212. Id. art. 20; see discussion supra Part IV.E.4.
213. See discussion supra Part IV.E.4.
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requires a right to use an unregistered trademark. For the reasons
given earlier, that is clearly not the case.214 If the spectrum argument
is rejected—and we argue that it must be rejected—the only
alternative is that Article 20 speaks of a privilege of using a
trademark subject to the government’s power to prevent such use in
identified circumstances, namely, when the internationally
recognizable legitimate interests of government justify a claim right
that defeats the privilege. One possible claim right to prevent use of
unregistered trademarks has already been identified in the WTO.215
Article 20 recognizes a defeasible privilege of use.216 To
appreciate how defeasible that privilege may be to state
intervention—that is, the parameters of “justifiability”—we will
identify the respective interests of trademark owners as well as
interests of the State that are recognized by Article 20. Then, we will
compare the relevant interests of trademark owners with State
interests.

F. THE RELEVANT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF TRADEMARK
OWNERS IN ARTICLE 20
A WTO panel has considered the general nature of a trademark
owner’s legitimate interests in the context of Article 17. In European
Communities – Trademarks and Geographical Indications, the Panel
held that “[a] legitimate interest of the owner is to maintain the
trademark’s capacity to distinguish the owner’s goods.”217 It
continued,
Every trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that it can
perform that function. This includes its interest in using its own trademark
in connection with the relevant goods and services of its own and
authorized undertakings. Taking account of that legitimate interest will
also take account of the trademark owner’s interest in the economic value
of its mark arising from the reputation that it enjoys and the quality that it

214. See id.
215. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 177, at 20.32–20.33 (citing the example of
the Chinese government prohibiting the commercialization of certain goods unless
they were sold with trademarks that had been registered in China).
216. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
217. European Communities – Trademarks and Geographical Indications,
supra note 57, ¶ 7.664.
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denotes.218

However, Article 20 does not refer to all of the legitimate interests
of trademark owners. Indeed, as already noted, it does not refer to
legitimate interests or rights per se.219 To the extent that Article 20
focuses on the legitimate interests of trademark owners, it focuses
only on the very specific interest identified by the text.220 Given that
Article 20 refers to the detriment of a trademark’s capability to
distinguish, Article 20 might be said to acknowledge a legitimate
interest in avoiding detriment to the capability of a trademark to
distinguish.
At this point, some reference back to Article 15 and some
discussion of the negotiating history behind Article 20 needs to
occur. As already discussed above, Article 15 refers to “any sign or
combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods . . . of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings.”221 Capability to
distinguish for inherently distinctive trademarks exists without use,
and Article 15 clearly recognizes this to be so.222 Article 20 refers to
“use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish.”223 At
the very least, Article 15 is a statement that significant capability to
distinguish, both for inherently distinctive trademarks and for those
that acquire distinctiveness through use and are then registered, is
maintained by the act of registration. Non-use of a trademark as a
consequence of a prohibition on its use has less of an impact on that
capability to distinguish than mandated uses contrary to the
trademark owner’s wishes. The main aspect of a legitimate interest in
using a trademark, vís-a-vís the State, is avoidance of such mandated
uses.
Furthermore, early versions of Article 20 did not refer to the
concept of “justifiability” of encumbrance at all. If any of those
versions had been accepted, under the spectrum approach to
trademarks, any restriction on the use of trademarks would have

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
TRIPS Agreement art. 20; see discussion supra Part IV.D.
DE CARVALHO, supra note 177, at 20.22–20.24.
TRIPS Agreement art. 15; see discussion supra Part IV.E.1.
TRIPS Agreement art. 15.
Id. art. 20.
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contravened TRIPS.224 And if a prohibition of advertisements using
trademarks constituted an encumbrance on use in the course of trade,
any prohibition would have contravened Article 20 and there would
have been no opportunity to justify the encumbrance.225
To read Article 20 more broadly than we have stated above 226
would mean reading into the Article a wide reference to all
legitimate interests even though the WTO had regularly used that
expression but did not do so in the context of Article 20. For
instance, and as de Carvalho has noted, it is difficult to see how
Article 20 requires the taking account of the reduction in economic
value of a trademark.227 Nothing in Article 20 acknowledges an
interest in maintaining the economic value of a trademark by
guaranteeing use. Indeed, in the relationship between trademark
owners and governments, governments do not guarantee the almost
unconditional maintenance of the economic value of trademarks,
especially in relation to trademarks in industries that they do not
wish to encourage. Stated alternatively, trademark owners do not
have a legitimate interest in promoting a product in relation to which
they use their trademarks. They do, however, have an interest in
retaining a capability to distinguish their particular brand of the
product from other brands.228 The proposition that there is a
legitimate interest in the promotion of consumption of tobacco only
needs to be stated to be refuted, unless mere lip service is being paid
to the adverse health effects of tobacco.229 Of course, one tobacco
224. See, e.g., Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating
Objective, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1, at 4 (Oct. 17, 1988); Draft Agreement
on
the
Trade-Related
Aspects
of
Intellectual
Property
Rights,
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70, art. 15 (May 11, 1990).
225. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 177, at 20.11 (appearing to suggest that “in
the course of trade” is confined to use of a trademark on the goods themselves, but
going on to state that a ban on advertising would not “relate directly to the course
of trade but cause an encumbrance to the use of the marks in the course of trade”).
226. See discussion supra Part IV.E.10.
227. If it is, the tobacco control measures of Australia and many other countries
over many years have clearly had an effect on the economic value of trademarks.
See DE CARVALHO, supra note 177, at 20.23.
228. While trademarks are used to maintain or increase market share for a
particular brand, they are also designed and used to increase the total consumption
of a particular brand. In combination, all brands are used to increase the total
consumption of the particular product.
229. If such an interest is not acknowledged, there cannot be a right to promote
or a privilege of promoting tobacco usage, nor something approaching a right to
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trader does not have a legitimate interest in preventing another
tobacco trader from promoting tobacco. But governments do.
In addition, the legitimate interest is an interest in use to minimize
or avoid the likelihood of confusion between different brands of
cigarettes. Article 16 tells us that the right of exclusion is aimed at
avoiding this type of confusion.230 Use is not an end in itself in a
trademark context, but an end for that particular purpose. Therefore,
use that involves a likelihood of confusion of consumers about the
qualities of the product that uses the trademarks is not a legitimate
interest of trademark owners. Where a trademark is being used
simultaneously for differentiating between different brands of a
product on the one hand and misleading consumers about the
product’s qualities on the other hand, there is a conflict between the
legitimate interests of the trademark owner in using the trademark for
differentiation purposes and the legitimate interests of the
government in preventing misleading uses of trademarks.
In any event, the interest of a trademark owner is only an interest
in use of trademarks, not use of signs per se. As pointed out above,
the privilege of using a sign is not a particularly significant privilege
unless it is an exclusive one as a consequence of having trademark
rights in relation to it.231 TRIPS acknowledges no legitimate interest
in signs per se and neither do international trademark norms and
practices. A government’s interests in prohibiting the use of signs to
prevent the promotion of a product or the misleading of consumers
about a product’s qualities might easily outweigh the interest in the
privilege of using signs, either as just signs or for the additional
purpose of converting those signs into trademarks. Short of
registration, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a government to
know if a particular sign or combination of signs has altered its status
from a sign to being a sign that is also a trademark. This difficulty is
but one reason why civil law countries do not acknowledge rights in
unregistered trademarks.232 The point at which the interests of the
State would outweigh the interests supporting a privilege of using a
sign would be easily reached. Again, the specific relationship matters

promote tobacco usage.
230. TRIPS Agreement art. 16.
231. See discussion supra Part III.A.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.E.4.
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in determining this outcome. Another trader has no interest in
interfering with the privilege of others to use signs that may or may
not be trademarks belonging to others. The government may well
have an interest in preventing use of such signs.233
Finally, a trademark owner’s interest in use is also restricted to use
in the course of trade. Use outside of the course of trade is not part of
its legitimate interests as a trademark owner. Although another trader
has no legitimate interest in interfering with the privilege of using
trademarks outside the course of trade, the government may well
have such an interest.

G. THE RELEVANT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT IN
ARTICLE 20
Are legitimate interests of government acknowledged in Article
20? The answer is an unequivocal “yes.” All of the previous
discussion points to Article 20 being a provision about a privilege of
use, not a right to use. The very nature of a privilege is such that one
anticipates circumstances in which some third parties may have a
claim right to restrict or prevent the exercise of the privilege. And
what else does the reference to “unjustifiably” in Article 20 refer to
other than the legitimate interests of government which might ground
such a claim right? As previously noted here and elsewhere, the
concept is not readily understood in a specific intellectual property
law context, so its meaning cannot be derived from that area of
law.234 It is readily understood in the context of rights, privileges, and
legitimate interests, as informing the scope of the power that
governments retain pursuant to Article 20.
At this point, it is also important to note again that the inclusion of
the reference to “unjustifiability” was a key component of the
ultimately successful negotiations to include Article 20 in TRIPS.
Some initial drafts of Article 20 did not adopt the word. Indeed,
initial drafts of the provision were very clearly quite specifically
aimed at actual uses of trademarks, not prohibitions on their use. For
example, an early proposal from the United States was that, “A
country shall not impose any special requirements for the use of a
trademark such as size or use in combination with another
233. See discussion infra Part IV.G.1–3.
234. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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trademark,”235 and Australia suggested that, “Registration should not
be dependent upon any special requirements for the use of a mark in
combination with another mark.”236
The inclusion of the concept of justifiability introduces into the
interpretation and application of Article 20 precisely the sort of
balancing act that is involved in considering the interplay between
rights, privileges, and legitimate interests of different parties. It is a
clear statement that the legitimate interests of the State are important
and are to be considered along with whatever legitimate interest of
trademark owners that Article 20 provides are important for the
purposes of defining the relationship between those owners and the
State.
At the beginning of this article, some of the legitimate interests of
government in regulating the use of signs in retail packaging for
tobacco were articulated. A more detailed statement of those interests
is provided below.
1. Prohibition on Use of Signs for Promotion
Governments have an interest in preventing the promotion of
tobacco consumption. This interest extends to the prevention of using
any signs to make tobacco products more attractive. The proposition
that promotion of tobacco occurs via the use of packaging is difficult
to refute. British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd has expressly
admitted in litigation that it uses its packaging to promote its
products as well as to differentiate them from others.237 At least one
Australian High Court justice has agreed with that proposition.238
235. See Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating
Objective, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1, at 4 (Oct. 17, 1988).
236. Standards and Norms for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual
Property
Rights
–
Communication
from
Australia,
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/35, at 4 (July 10, 1989).
237. British American Tobacco Australasia Limited v Commonwealth, [2011]
Submission of the Plaintiff’s Reply at 7, S389 (Feb. 24, 2012) (Austl.).
238. JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43, 286 (Austl.). In her opinion,
Justice Crennan stated,
While the prime concern of the Trade Marks Act is with the capacity of a trade mark
to distinguish the goods of the registered owner from those of another trader, trade
marks undoubtedly perform other functions. For example, a trade mark can be an
indicium of the quality of goods sold under or by reference to it and it may be accepted
that distinctive marks can have a capacity to advertise, and therefore to promote, sales
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There is significant evidence from the documents of tobacco
companies that they use packaging to promote their products.239
The plain packaging legislation is directed at all signs, whether or
not they are trademarks, and the use of signs to promote tobacco by
making it more attractive. The proposition that signs on packaging
are used to promote tobacco is expressly acknowledged in
Guidelines to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.240 In
this regard, at this point in our discussion, the Convention and its
of products sold under or by reference to them.

Id.
239. See, e.g., Kathy Kotnowski & David Hammond, The Impact of Cigarette
Pack Shape, Size and Opening: Evidence from Tobacco Company Documents, 108
ADDICTION 1658 (2013). See generally MARIANNE ROSNER KLIMCHUK & SANDRA
A. KRASOVEC, PACKAGING DESIGN: SUCCESSFUL PRODUCT BRANDING FROM
CONCEPT TO SHELF (2012); Alison Ford, Crawford Moodie & Gerard Hastings,
The Role of Packaging for Consumer Products: Understanding the Move Towards
‘Plain’ Tobacco Packaging, 20 ADDICT RES THEORY 339 (2012); Crawford
Moodie et al., Plain Tobacco Packaging: A Systematic Review, UNIV. STIRLING
(2012), available at http://phrc.lshtm.ac.uk/papers/PHRC_006_Final_Report.pdf
[hereinafter Moodie et al., Plain Tobacco Packaging]; R.P. Ferris, The Influence of
Brand Identification and Imagery on Subjective Evaluation of Cigarettes (18 July
1980), Report No. RD 1752-C. Restricted British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd
Group, Bates No. 103411673-103411674, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library
(insisting that in order to maximally influence the public, it was necessary to
explore the full effect that packaging had on perception and buying habits);
Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence from
Tobacco Industry Documents, TOBACCO CONTROL 11 (2002), available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i73.full [hereinafter Wakefield
et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image]; Philip Morris, “Philip Morris USA Five Year
Plan 920000-960000”, 1992–1996, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library; Crawford
Moodie & Gerard Hastings, Tobacco Packaging as Promotion, 19 TOBACCO
CONTROL 168 (2010). The potential for two dimensional and three dimensional
changes in packaging is almost infinite and it is unrealistic to expect a government
to engage in specific identification of particular promotional or misleading aspects
of packaging of tobacco and to target just those specific aspects. To do so would
require a never-ending game of regulatory “whack-a-mole” as new forms of
packaging designed to promote tobacco are devised.
240. Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, Durban, South Africa, Nov. 17–22, 2008, Guidelines for Implementation
of Article 13 (Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship), 36, WHO DOC.
FCTC/COP/3/12, Annex (Nov. 22, 2008) (“Promotional effects, both direct and
indirect, may be brought about by the use of words, designs, images, sounds and
colours, including brand names, trademarks, logos, names of tobacco
manufacturers or importers, and colours or schemes of colours associated with
tobacco products, manufacturers or importers, or by the use of a part or parts of
words, designs, images and colours.”).
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guidelines are used to assist in proving various factual propositions.
Tobacco packaging is used to promote tobacco and it is used to
mislead consumers about the characteristics of the product and one
of the reasons we know this is that over 170 nations have signed or
acceded to a treaty that says so.241 In that regard, there can be and is
no conflict with TRIPS nor any attempt to override TRIPS. The
complainants have the right to adduce evidence to contradict these
propositions of fact.
2. Promotion Outside the Course of Trade
Plain packaging legislation is primarily aimed at preventing the
use of packaging in social settings, outside the course of trade, to
promote consumption of tobacco. Again, significant evidence shows
that this use of packaging is precisely what tobacco companies aim
to achieve.242
3. Misleading Uses of Signs
Signs used in tobacco packaging can be used and are used to
suggest misleading impressions about the characteristics of particular
241. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en (last visited Jan. 28, 2014)
(reflecting that there are 177 Parties to the World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control).
242. See Letter from R.P. Ferris, British Am. Tobacco Co., on Communication
of Novel Product Features (Apr. 29, 1981) (on file with the Legacy Tobacco
Documents
Library,
Univ.
of
California-San
Francisco),
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tdz75a99/pdf (suggesting that “paper colour may
be useful . . . in signifying to non-smokers that a smoker is using a sidestream
attenuated product” and that “[d]esigning a pack to encourage display rather than
concealment also improves communication, one way of achieving this is to
texturise, emboss, or incorporate manipulable detail in order to encourage handling
the pack.”); RJ Reynolds, Trendsetters, Trends, Trendsetting, UNIV. CAL. S.F.
(May 1, 1997) (finding that targeting influencers as a social group and those who
are easily led as a social group as the primary social groups to be targeted in
advertising). See generally Philip Morris, Marketing New Products in a Restrictive
Environment, LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS LIBRARY (June 1990), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yhs55e00/pdf; Wakefield et al., The Cigarette
Pack as Image, supra note 239; Memorandum from J.C. Bogie, Product Manager,
to R.E. Smith, Vice President of Brand Management, Lucky Strike Package
Design Exploratory (Oct. 23, 1990); “Brand Strategies” (26 June 1984), Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library (finding that increasing the image of Camel cigarettes
as masculine and guaranteeing independence drew young adult smokers to the
brand).
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tobacco products. The proposition is expressly acknowledged in
Article 11 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Article 11 provides that members of the Convention should take
effective measures to ensure that:
(a) tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco
product by any means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to
create an erroneous impression about its characteristics, health effects,
hazards or emissions, including any term, descriptor, trademark,
figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates the false
impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than other
tobacco products.243

Examples of such misleading behavior include the use of colors
and other signs to indicate a suggested but misleading relative
strength of different cigarettes.244
4. “A Manner Conductive to Social and Economic Welfare”
Article 7 outlines the object of TRIPS:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
243. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 11, WHA Res.
56.1, World Health Assembly, 56th Ass., 4th plen. mtg, Agenda Item 13, Annex,
WHO Doc. A56.VR/4 (May 21, 2003), http://www.who.int/tobacco/fctc/text/en/
fctc_en.pdf.
244. See, e.g., David Hammond & Carla Parkinson, The Impact of Cigarette
Package Design on Perceptions of Risk, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH 345, 346 (2009)
(noting that words such as “light” and “mild,” and use of different shades of the
same color in conjunction with white space are used to indicate relative strength of
different cigarettes). See generally Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image,
supra note 239; Moodie et al., Plain Tobacco Packaging, supra note 239; E.C.
Etzel, Consumer Research Proposal: Camel Filter Revised Packaging Test Study,
RJ REYNOLDS (Mar. 2, 1979) (testing whether increasing the white color of a
cigarette package changed the test subjects’ perceptions of the cigarettes); W.L.
Dunn & P.G. Martin, Flavor Development Two Pastel Green Menthol Field Tests,
LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS LIBRARY (Jan. 7, 1998) (finding that in using
green paper for menthol cigarettes, the darker the green, the more the test subjects
perceived the cigarettes to be menthol-flavored); R. Howes, National Test
Ranking: Saratoga Menthol, More Menthol, Saratoga Menthol with Green Paper,
LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS LIBRARY (July 1976); P. Martin, Two National
POL Mailout Tests: Philip Morris, LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS LIBRARY
(March 27, 1973) (listing the possible color combinations of the product).
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and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 245

A formalistic interpretation of Article 7 may restrict the
consideration of “a manner conductive to social and economic
welfare” to intellectual property other than trademarks because of the
reference to “the mutual advantage of producers and uses of
technological knowledge.”246 On the other hand, such an approach
would struggle to explain why Article 7 does not mean that “[t]he
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to . . . a balance of rights and obligations”247 and why that
proposition is not relevant to interpretation of Article 20. Other
formalistic interpretations can no doubt be proffered, but one that
takes into account the object and purpose of TRIPS would also
struggle to discount social and economic welfare from the discussion
of Article 20 and the notion of justifiability. As noted in the Doha
Declaration, TRIPS can be and should be interpreted in the light of
its objectives and principles.248
5. Public Health as a Legitimate Interest
The debate about the relevance of health as a general principle by
which justification of encumbrances may be demonstrated has
occurred in other publications.249 The essence of the debate is
whether health measures must be necessary under Article 8(1) to
constitute a justification for the purposes of Article 20, or whether
the reference to justification encompasses the basic principle that
protecting public health is highly relevant to considering whether
plain packaging is permissible under TRIPS.
We do not wish to duplicate that debate unnecessarily. However,
we consider that the theoretical analysis of rights, privileges, and
legitimate interests that this article has undertaken in the context of
Article 20 plays an important part in the debate. Our analysis clearly
245. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, art. 5(a),
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
249. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the TRIPS Agreement: A
Response to Professors Davison, Mitchell and Voon, 23 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J.
96 (2013) [hereinafter Gervais, Response to Davison, Mitchell and Voon].
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demonstrates that there are circumstances in which a government’s
internationally recognizable legitimate interests may give rise to a
claim right that defeats the privilege of use. In such circumstances,
that government’s power to restrict that use is not limited by Article
20.
Little doubt remains that Members have an internationally
recognized claim right to protect public health. The WTO has
confirmed this fact expressly in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health.250 The Declaration does not simply acknowledge the
legitimate interests of governments in health: it expressly uses the
words “right to protect public health,”251 just as the WTO used the
word “right” or “rights” on the 131 occasions in the drafting of the
TRIPS agreement. It also expressly acknowledges “a right . . . to use,
to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
flexibility for this purpose.”252 The reference to a right of
governments is entirely in keeping with the theoretical framework
discussed in this article and the proposition that governments can
have a claim right to severely restrict the privilege of using
trademarks. If further evidence is required, the reference to a right of
governments can be contrasted with the already-noted lack of a right
of trademark owners to use a trademark. In the balancing of interests,
the right to protect health will trump the privilege of using
trademarks in the context of the concerns about tobacco packaging
that are addressed above.
Apart from the express reference in paragraph four of the Doha
Declaration to rights of government, paragraph five of the Doha
Declaration goes on to provide:
Accordingly and in the light of paragraph four above, while maintaining
250. Doha Declaration, supra note 248, art. 4. This article does not, at this
point, make any specific claim as to the interpretive status of the Doha Declaration.
Others have debated that issue. See, e.g., Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell,
Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC
HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 109 (Tania Voon
et al. eds., 2012); Gervais, Response to Davison, Mitchell and Voon, supra note
249. We are simply pointing out the obvious fact that nations have a claim right to
protect the health of their citizens and that the Doha Declaration confirms this
view. Complainants have the right to challenge the legal proposition that such a
claim right exists.
251. Doha Declaration, supra note 248, art. 4.
252. Id. art. 4.
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our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these
flexibilities include:
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of
the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.253

Notably, all but three members of the WTO are also members of
the World Health Organization (“WHO”).254 Each of these comembers was a member of WHO prior to its membership of the
WTO and has pledged itself, under Article 1 of the Constitution of
WHO, to “the objective of . . . the attainment by all peoples of the
highest possible level of health.”255 In having regard to this fact in
interpreting Article 20, there can be and is no conflict with TRIPS
nor any attempt to override TRIPS: the preamble to TRIPS itself
states a desire by member states to “to establish a mutually
supportive relationship between the WTO and other relevant
international organizations,” of which WHO would be one. As noted
previously, general principles of treaty interpretation require other
relevant international legal obligations to be taken into account in
interpreting TRIPS.256
In light of all that has been said above in relation to rights,
privileges, and legitimate interests, plus other relevant international
legal considerations, it is difficult to see how the protection of public
health is not a legitimate interest of governments that is included
within the concept of “justifiability” in Article 20. Indeed, it would
distort the meaning of TRIPS, and threaten its integration and
coherence with the broader framework of international legal
principle, to interpret Article 20 in a contrary fashion. The formal
reference to “justifiability” rather than “necessity” aligns with the
concept of legitimate interests and with the proposition that
governments enjoy the power to assert a claim right that restricts the
privilege of using signs, including trademarks. In other words, the
words and the principles all point in the same direction.

253.
254.
Union.
255.
256.

Id. art. 5.
The exceptions are Liechtenstein, Chinese Taipei, and the European
Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 1.
See discussion supra Part III.
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H. THE ONUS OF PROOF
The theoretical analysis in which we have engaged contributes to
another debate, about the onus of proof for the purposes of Article
20. Again, the matter has been explored elsewhere and we do not
wish to repeat what has already been said by others.257 One view is
that the onus is on a complainant to demonstrate that an
encumbrance by special requirement is unjustifiable258 while the
contrary view is that the onus is on the respondent to demonstrate
that its encumbrances are justifiable. Given the wording
“unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements,” the formalistic
argument would seem to favor the former view or, at least, make
such an interpretation clearly available.
The theoretical analysis that we offer here also favors the onus
being on the complainant to demonstrate that encumbrances are
unjustifiable. The legitimate interests of governments clearly give
rise to a claim right against use in some circumstances, while
trademark owners enjoy a privilege of use in others. A balancing of
the respective interests is to be undertaken. In reality, both
complainant and respondent will give evidence about the nature of
those interests and how the evidence relates to those interests. The
Panel, and if necessary, the Appellate Body, will then consider the
balance of those interests, but it must decide what to do if the
evidence suggests the interests are essentially equal in weight.
Given that Article 20 clearly contemplates circumstances in which
governments may act upon a claim right, it follows that there are
government interests that are entitled to respect and in relation to
which the balance of reasons requires trademark owners to submit to
a duty to respect those interests. On the other hand, Article 20
acknowledges no more than a privilege of trademark owners. It
imposes no duty to facilitate use as opposed to a no-right to control
use in some limited circumstances.259 The balance would therefore
seem to favor the outcome of respecting the right rather than the
257. See Gervais, Response to Davison, Mitchell and Voon, supra note 249, at
103–05; Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Implications of WTO Law for Plain
Packaging of Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF
CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 109, 124–25 (Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell &
Jonathan Liberman eds., 2012).
258. Voon & Mitchell, supra note 257, at 124–25.
259. TRIPS Agreement art. 20.
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privilege in the event of uncertainty, especially in the light of the
consequences of an error being made one way or the other. In
particular, it needs to be remembered that the rights of registration
and exclusion are maintained if the privilege of use is denied.260 Later
challenges to the legislation can occur if the actual outcome of plain
packaging is that it does not advance the legitimate interests of
government. If, after proper implementation and execution, it does
not actually justify the encumbrance on trademarks that it imposes, it
will not be a permissible exercise of power under Article 20. 261 The
privilege of use can then be restored. The position is different if the
legislation is invalidated. Once successfully challenged, it is difficult
to envisage the circumstances in which it can be later validated. The
opportunity to justify that which may have been justifiable will have
been lost.

I. DO THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE JUSTIFY A CLAIM RIGHT TO
SUPPORT THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON TOBACCO COMPANIES BY
PLAIN PACKAGING LEGISLATION?
To answer this question, we must weigh the interests of the State
described above against the limited legitimate interest of trademark
owners that is identified by Article 20, keeping in mind the foregoing
remarks about onus of proof.262 The question cannot be answered
from a fixed position of the importance of trademarks to trademark
owners, nor by reference to the full entitlements of trademark owners
against other traders. Doing so fails to take into account the relational
nature of property, rights, privileges and legitimate interests.
On the other hand, the legitimate interests of the State need to be
considered in the context of the intellectual property in question. One
cannot simply say “public health” or “social and economic welfare”
or “balance of rights and obligations” and automatically win the day.
260. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 28(3) (Austl.).
261. Gervais, Response to Davison, Mitchell and Voon, supra note 249, at 109
(“A later case (or a second case against the same Member at a later date) in the
face of actual empirical evidence on the effectiveness of a measure can be expected
to be looked at differently. If plain packaging were indeed highly successful in
meeting its public policy objectives, there would presumably be a push for its
adoption by others . . . . Conversely, if plain packaging failed to further reduce
smoking after a fair amount of time, justification would be a harder case to
make.”).
262. See discussion supra Part IV.H.
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The connection between those legitimate interests and the many
different working parts of the international trademark system has
been spelled out above in some detail.263
Finally, in balancing the respective interests of the State and
tobacco trademark owners, some important aspects of the specific
balance created by the plain packaging legislation need to be borne
in mind. First, the legislation does not take away the rights of
exclusion or even the opportunity to obtain the right of exclusion
through registration.264 If the tobacco companies can win the hearts
and minds of the Australian people in a democratic election, the
government can alter the legislation and fully restore the privilege of
use that existed prior to the plain packaging legislation. Tobacco
companies can and do make donations to electoral parties that are
prepared to accept those donations.265 They can and have run their
own advertising campaigns against plain packaging legislation albeit
with a spectacular lack of success.266 In that sense, the plain
packaging legislation is temporary because it is no more permanent
than any other legislation.
Second, the legislation applies to all tobacco packaging equally. It
does not discriminate in favor of one trademark owner or against
another.267 Third, and importantly, a very significant aspect of the
privilege of use is maintained. As noted at the start of this article, the
privilege of using word trademarks is maintained by the
legislation.268 Due to the regulation of sale of tobacco prior to the
plain packaging legislation, word trademarks were the primary, if not
the sole means by which tobacco products were differentiated in the
course of trade. Display of packaging at or prior to the point of sale
263. See discussion supra Part IV.E, IV.G.
264. See TPP Act 2011 s 28.
265. See Margaret H. Winstanley, The Tobacco Industry in Australian Society,
in TOBACCO IN AUSTRALIA: FACTS AND ISSUES 10.20 (Cancer Council ed., Becky
Freeman rev., 2010). The Liberal Party of Australia continues to accept donations
from Philip Morris Australia and British American Tobacco Australia whereas the
Australian Labor Party ceased accepting donations from tobacco companies in
2004.
266. See, e.g., Rob Moodie, Nanny Knows Best: Why Big Tobacco’s Attack on
Mary Poppins Ought to Backfire, THE CONVERSATION (June 20, 2011),
http://theconversation.com/nanny-knows-best-why-big-tobaccos-attack-on-marypoppins-ought-to-backfire-1851.
267. See discussion supra Part IV.E.6.
268. See discussion supra Part II.

2014]

ARTICLE 20 OF TRIPS AND PLAIN PACKAGING

577

was already prohibited.269 The maintenance of the privilege of using
word trademarks means that tobacco companies continue to have the
opportunity to distinguish their products from other products and to
do so by the prime means of distinguishing that existed prior to the
plain packaging legislation.270 This maintenance of that critical part
of the privilege of distinguishing one tobacco product from another
tobacco product is part of the balancing of the interests of tobacco
trademark owners with the legitimate interests of government.
Fourth, all commentators seem to agree that a government can
simply prohibit the sale of tobacco altogether without that
prohibition being subject to any scrutiny under TRIPS.271 The
theoretical basis upon which the government can do an end run
around trademarks in this way is not clear. One might argue that if
the sale of the product is prohibited, no legitimate interest exists in
using trademarks to differentiate between different brands of the
product. However, that would seem to avoid the logically prior
question as to whether the government has a legitimate interest in
banning the product, which underpins a claim right grounding a
correlative duty not to sell the product, especially since the ban has
the effect of both detrimentally affecting the right of exclusion and
the privilege of use. Presumably, the Paris Convention requirement
not to deny registration on the basis of the nature of the goods in
question would not apply where the sale of the product is unlawful
and both registration and the right of exclusion would be lost in due
course.272
269. See discussion supra Part II.A.
270. Whether legislation could go further and prevent the use of all trademarks
in relation to tobacco does not need to be considered at this point. As it stands, the
legislation does permit the use of word trademarks. The issue was specifically
addressed by Justice Crennan in her judgment in JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth
[2012] HCA 43, 99 (Austl.) (“The complaint that the plaintiffs were deprived of
the ‘substance’ and ‘reality’ of their proprietorship in their property because they
could not use their registered trade marks as registered, or their associated product
get-up, left out of account the significance of their ability to continue to use their
brand names so as to distinguish their tobacco products, thereby continuing to
generate custom and goodwill.”).
271. Gervais, Response to Davison, Mitchell and Voon, supra note 249, at 99;
Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules, supra note
114, ¶ 100; Frankel & Gervais, supra note 52, 1204–06.
272. If the position were otherwise, trademarks for heroin would not only be
registrable but there would be an obligation to register them.
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While scholars may disagree about the theoretical basis or
justification for prohibiting the sale of (hitherto) trademarked
products,273 a prohibition on any sales of tobacco would not likely
benefit the interests of tobacco trademark owners. If the government
has the power to impose a duty not to sell at all and its power to
impose such a duty is unquestioned, that fact must have some
implications for the balancing act under Article 20. If regulation
short of prohibition does no greater damage to the relevant legitimate
interests of tobacco trademark owners than prohibition, why does
government not have the power to impose that regulation,
particularly when (as noted above) tobacco trademark owners
continue to enjoy the privilege of using their word trademarks to
distinguish their products in the marketplace?
Fifth, we draw some comfort from the fact that the legal advice to
major tobacco companies clearly indicated to them that they have no
prospect of successfully resisting plain packaging legislation via
TRIPS or GATT. In 1994, a number of tobacco companies held a
conference addressing issues such as the possibility of plain
packaging.274 A presentation to that conference stated that a working
group had considered the issue with a strong legal accent. 275 The
conclusion of the working group expressed in the overhead slide to
the conference was literally: “GATT/TRIPS little joy.”276 We agree
273. See, e.g., Gervais, Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging
Rules, supra note 114, ¶ 110 (stating that WTO Members can ban “certain”
products, suggesting that there are some products that cannot be banned and
thereby enlivening the question of which products can be banned and on what
basis).
274. Fax from Souza Cruz on Tobacco Strategy Group Meeting of May 11,
1994 (May 5, 1994) (on file with the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, Univ.
of California-San Francisco).
275. The precise wording of the relevant slide was,
Plain pack group
Terms of reference
Review attacks on designs and trademarks
Identify opportunities for action
Membership
BAT, PMI, RJR, Rothmans, Rheemstma, Imperial UK, Gallaher
Strong legal accent

See Presentation Slides from the British Am. Tobacco Co. to the WHO (Mar. 4,
1999) (on file with the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, Univ. of CaliforniaSan Francisco).
276. The precise wording of the entire relevant slide was,
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with the legal conclusion implicit in that statement but do not
necessarily agree with the sentiment accompanying it. The
occasional suggestion that Article 20 was specifically drafted with
plain packaging in mind is news to tobacco companies.277 Ultimately,
there is good reason for believing that the real complaint of tobacco
companies is the loss of a chance to further promote their product.
Their interest in doing so was never legitimate.

V. CONCLUSION
All of the above could be put into the following, relatively brief
statements. First, trademark owners do not have a right to use their
trademarks, nor do they have something more than a privilege that
approaches a right. They have a privilege of using their trademarks.
Second, in considering the extent to which the privilege is
defeasible, attention must be paid to the relationship between
trademark owners and those claiming a right to prevent the exercise
of the privilege. Other traders have little or no legitimate interest in
preventing the exercise of the privilege of use. In that sense and in
the context of that relationship, the privilege of use is not subject to
significant limitations.
Third, governments, as regulators of trademarks in a manner that
does not favor other traders, do have significant interests in
preventing the exercise of the privilege. In that sense and in the
context of that relationship, the privilege of use is subject to very
Findings
Current conventions & treaties afford little protection
GATT/TRIPS little joy
Other industry groupings little support
Domestic political solutions needed

See id.
277. See Stephen Stern & Olivia Draudins, Generic Packaging – A Bridge
(Over the Bodies of IP Rights) Too Far?, 23 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 146
(2011) (citing Memorandum from Michael Arblaster, Trade Mark Technical Pol’y
& Projects, Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, IP Australia, to Karen Tipler,
Domestic Policy Section, IP Australia (Feb. 18, 2009)) (disclosed in response to a
Freedom of Info. request); see also Peter Drahos, 35 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 367,
368 (2013) (reviewing GERVAIS, TRIPS DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 4th
Edition, supra note 129) (“[T]he first policy proposals for plain packaging did not
appear until the late 1980s in Canada. By then the tobacco industry, which was
well ahead of most industries in understanding the global power of brands, was an
enthusiastic supporter of strong global trade mark protection.”).
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significant limitations.
Fourth, the privilege is particularly defeasible in the context of
public health and the promotion of tobacco via the use of signs to
promote consumption.
Last, Article 20 acknowledges points one to three, by permitting
States to defeat the privilege via the assertion of claim rights against
trademark owners when such claim rights are justifiable, that is, are
grounded in internationally recognizable legitimate interests that
defeat those of trademark owners. In light of our fourth point, plain
packaging is likely to be justifiable in this sense and hence
permissible under Article 20.

